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THE DEATH OF APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE:
ENDING WINDFALLS FOR DEAL DISSENTERS
WILLIAM J. CARNEY & KEITH SHARFMAN*
ABSTRACT
In this article, we take note of a new and positive development in
Delaware's law of appraisal: more robust enforcement of Section 262(h),
which expressly excludes from fair value in appraisal litigation the value
that is uniquely associated with the deal from which the shareholders
seeking appraisal are dissenting. For public firms, this implies that deal
dissenters are entitled to no more than the price that prevailed prior to the
deal's announcement.
In a salutary development, the Delaware Chancery Court took this
approach in its recent appraisal decision in Verition Master Fund
Partners, Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., awarding to the deal dissenters the
pre-announcement price and striking a blow against "appraisal
arbitrage"—a trading and litigation strategy that is predicated on deal
dissenters receiving appraisal remedies in excess of the deal prices from
which they dissent.
We explore here the historical and economic rationales for limiting
the appraisal remedy in this fashion. And we conclude with some
recommendations for ending or limiting appraisal windfalls in the context
of private firms as well via contractual and corporate bylaw valuation
mechanisms that would replace judicial with market valuation in
appraisal litigation as well as select litigation fora that would be amenable
to enforcement of such mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION
“Appraisal proceedings have hardly been the Delaware courts' finest
moments.”1
The Delaware courts have recently been swamped with a wave of
appraisal actions, even as other forms of merger and acquisition litigation
have abated, due to the increasingly clear bright lines and safe harbors for
fiduciary behavior that these courts have evolved in recent years.2 The
earlier litigation was inspired by opaque standards of behavior that left the
courtroom door open for plaintiffs to file complaints and remain in court
long enough to drag settlements out of many corporate defendants. This
uncertainty was criticized and discussed by many scholars and lawyers.3
Now the opaque nature of legal standards has turned to appraisal
cases. Dissenting shareholders are entitled to dissent and be awarded the
“fair value” of their shares, without consideration of any value resulting
from anticipation or realization of the merger.4 In many areas of law, there
is a simple standard applied—what a reasonable and informed seller and
buyer would agree upon— each being fully informed and under no
constraints. But that contemplates a “deal,” which is exactly what the
appraisal remedy allows shareholders to avoid. In real life markets,
involving sufficient information and trading activity, investors must
accept the market price as the only one available, whether buying or
selling. That price is the result of hundreds if not thousands of “deals” by
reasonable investors.5 But in Delaware, valuation of a dissenter’s shares
1
William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The Delaware
Courts’ Struggle with Control Premiums, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 845 (2003).
2
As other forms of merger litigation decline, appraisal filings in Delaware have
increased from 20 cases in 2012 to 48 in 2016, a 240% increase in four years. Appraisal Risk in
Private Equity Transactions, PRIV. EQUITY DIG. (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP), May 2017, https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3977122/may-2017-pe-digest-r15.pdf. A
recent study showed that appraisal petitions increased from about 2% of deals in the early 2000s
to around 25% in the 2010s. The top seven hedge funds seeking appraisal accounted for over
50% of the dollar value in all appraisals. Wei Jiang, et al., Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or
Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J. L. & ECON. 697, 698 (2016). Another study shows that multiple
petitions are being filed in these cases, with 77 petitions in 2016. Michael Greene, Dealmakers
Eye Safeguards Amid Rising Valuation Challenges, BLOOMBERG BNA, (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/dealmakers-eye-safeguards-n57982086799/.
3
We only cite one of these criticisms here: See e.g., William J. Carney & George B.
Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2009).
4
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 2016).
5
“In such circumstances, a company's stock price ‘reflects the judgments of many
stockholders about the company's future prospects, based on public filings, industry information,
and research conducted by equity analysts.’ In these circumstances, a mass of investors quickly
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ignores the realities of the market6 and, in the words of Chief Justice
Strine, fair value has become “a jurisprudential, rather than purely
economic, construct.”7 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel had a more
jaded view of fairness: “an empty vessel into which lawyers and judges
can pour whatever content suits them and their clients from time to time.”8
For most investors, determining value is as simple as looking at the
current price of a stock, and applying whatever analytical skills they may
have, deciding whether the price is “fair” (a word they would not generally
use) and acting upon it. Sophisticated investors understand how much
knowledge and analysis have gone into determining that price, and
understand that relative to other price estimates, it is “fair” in the sense of
an unbiased assessment of value by market participants. The Delaware
courts’ departure from (or discounting of) this commonly accepted
evidence has led to extensive litigation and interminably long opinions in
many cases. In this Article, we explore how this has happened, and what
should be done about it. We also observe a major step in the right direction
by the Court of Chancery in Verition Partners Master Fund LTD v. Aruba
Networks, Inc (“Aruba”).9
Part I discusses the history and purpose of the appraisal remedy and
shows that it was merely intended to provide an exit to avoid the

digests all publicly available information about a company, and in trading the company's stock,
recalibrates its price to reflect the market's adjusted, consensus valuation of the company.” Dell,
Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund, Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 45–46 (Del. 2017).
6
See In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *23 (Del. Ch.
May 31, 2016) (“Requiring the Court of Chancery to defer – conclusively or presumptively – to
the merger price, even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged transactional process, would
contravene the unambiguous language of the statute and the reasoned holdings of our
precedent”) (citing Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP, 11 A.2d 214, 217-18 (Del. 2010)).
On the other hand, for reasons we expand on below, accepting the deal price over the preannouncement market price also contravenes the unambiguous language of the same statute,
which excludes consideration of anticipated or realized effects of the transaction.
7
DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 367 (Del. 2017).
8
“Fairness is an invulnerable position; who is for unfairness? But for lawyers fairness
is ‘a suitcase full of bottled ethics from which one freely chooses to blend his own type of
justice.'" William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 25 (2009) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 703 n.17 (1982)) (quoting George Stigler,
The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1972))..
See also Veritian Partners Master Fund Ltd. V. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018
WL 2315943 (Del. Ch, May 21, 2018) (“Aruba II”).
9
Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448–VCL, 2018
WL 922139 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (“Aruba”).
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(presumably negative) consequences of a merger for a nonconsenting
shareholder.
Part II discusses the history of valuation in the Delaware courts,
which involved deep suspicion of the fairness and rationality of even
highly developed and well-informed markets. This evolved, as recently
characterized by the Supreme Court, into a question, not of economic fact,
but of “jurisprudence.”
Part III briefly reviews modern knowledge about the value of
publicly traded stocks, much of which has been recited by the Supreme
Court in its opinion in DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value
Partners, L.P, and in Dell.10 Much of this knowledge is explored in a
theoretical fashion in appraisal litigation, with opposing experts usually
making different assumptions to produce sometimes wildly varying
results, with little or no relationship to pre-deal market prices. All this, we
assert, is much ado about nothing, when there is an established and
efficient market that has valued the stock immediately before a deal
announcement.
Part IV notes that while the Delaware courts have moved closer to
respect for deal values, they have repeatedly declined to give up their
broad “jurisprudential” discretion in determining value. Ironically, while
relying on a statutory command to consider “all relevant factors” as
authority for this discretion, the courts have largely ignored the limitation
in the preceding sentence of the statute to exclude “elements of value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger . . . .” 11 The
courts have too often begun with the deal price, if determined in good faith
after a search for the highest price. In many cases the analysis stops
there—ignoring the value attributable to the merger—the gains from trade.
In others the experts on each side attempt to guess what portion of the deal
price is attributable to the synergies reflected in the deal price. All of this
is done in the face of a plain answer—the difference between the preannouncement market price and the deal price.
Part V explores possible solutions to the inefficiency of appraisal
litigation, which consumes judicial resources and the public purse, adds
uncertainty to buyers’ cost calculations, and in some cases chills deals or
reduces the prices that buyers are willing to agree to, given the risk of
litigation costs and awards that appraisal litigation would entail. While
10
11

DFC Global, 172 A.3d 346; Dell, Inc., 177 A.3d 1, 45.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h).
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our analysis mainly addresses appraisal in cases where an efficient capital
market exists, much of what we criticize in those cases is sometimes
necessary, though perilous, where there is no market price.
Our core proposal is for courts called upon to value shares of public
firms in appraisal litigation to rely exclusively and conclusively on the
unconflicted, arms’ length pre-deal market price (if one exists) in
determining fair value. Secondarily, we consider other market-based and
market mimicking reforms for appraisal litigation in the case of closely
held firms, where no pre-deal market price is available for the court to
consider.
I.

THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE APPRAISAL REMEDY

The concept of appraisal of the shares of dissenters in mergers arose
in an era when corporate charters were regarded as contracts between and
among the state and shareholders.12 As a result, important mergers in
railroads and other developing industries generally required the consent of
all shareholders to proceed.13 It became apparent that allowing a single
dissenter to block otherwise valuable transactions was neither good
judicial nor legislative policy. The courts moved first: in Lauman v.
Lebanon Valley R.R., the court analogized a merger to the sale of assets
and dissolution of a company, which did not require unanimity, and
allowed the proposed merger to proceed, provided the dissenter was
provided the same value he or she would receive in an asset sale, and
issued an injunction until the corporation gave security for the payment
“when its value shall be ascertained.”14 Lauman expressly stated the
contractual rationale for an exit: that the shareholder had contracted to be
in one corporation for a specific purpose, and could not be forced into
another without his consent.15 The court analogized this shareholder

12

See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
William Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and
Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 77–82.
14
Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. Co., 30 Pa. 42, 49 (1858); Accord State ex rel. Brown
v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46, 51–52 (1861) (citing Lauman, 30 Pa. at 47).
15
Lauman, 30 Pa. at 45–46 (“If the principle of the association is violated by a majority
of its members, by a departure from its original purposes, or by a refusal, or voluntarily produced
inability to proceed, any stockholder may treat such a matter as equivalent to a dissolution, at
least as regards him, and for such a case the law provides a means of securing to him his share
of the property, or its value. . . . Then, what valid objection can a dissenting stockholder of a
private corporation have to such an arrangement as the one now proposed? . . . He may object
that his co-corporators have no power to make a new contract for him, and thereby constitute
13
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action to a suit in partition of jointly owned real property. Where a statute
authorized a majority to approve a merger, objecting shareholders were
presumed to have consented to the merger, as they purchased their shares
under this rule.16 Throughout the 19th century and into the early 20th
century, this approach became accepted: where the majority was granted
the power of approval, some states granted appraisal rights to dissenters.17
Manning observed that appraisal statutes became the norm over time.18
Why grant dissenting shareholders an exit remedy when the
majority has approved a transaction, presumably on the basis of net
benefits that they reasonably expect? One explanation might be the fear
of majority self-dealing in mergers or other combinations, a well-known
issue even by the early 20th century.19 Requiring appraisal values to
exclude the potentially adverse effects of a merger on the value of a
company’s stock provides protection for minorities from being exploited.
Recent Delaware opinions seem to have recognized this principle.20 One
might have thought that it would provide a disincentive for quarreling over
whether the upside gains from a majority-approved merger were large
enough, but it has generally failed to do so.

him a member of a new and different corporation; for it is of the very nature of a contract relation
that it can be instituted only by the real parties to it . . . .”).
16
VICTOR MORAWETZ, 2 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 951, at 909
(2d ed. 1886).
17
See Seymour D. Thompson & Joseph W. Thompson, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6060, at 884–85 (2d ed. 1910).
18
Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L. J. 223, 226 (1962–1963).
19
See Carney, supra note 13, at 71–72. Until 2016 the Model Business Corporation Act
followed this approach for public companies, denying appraisal rights in publicly traded
corporations where exit was simple, but restoring them where the merger was an “interested
transaction.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §13.02(b)(4) (2016). Indeed, Lauman was such a case
where the surviving corporation owned a majority of the shares of the acquired corporation.
Lauman, 30 Pa. at 43.
20
In Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that “the key inquiry is whether the
dissenters got fair value and were not exploited.” 177 A.3d at 24. As Vice Chancellor Laster
stated in Aruba, referring to this statement in Dell, “the reference to ‘dissenters’ in this sentence
strikes me as odd because the dissenters have opted not to receive the merger consideration. By
seeking appraisal, they avoided the possibility of being ‘exploited’ by the deal.” Verition
Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448–VCL, 2018 WL 922139 at *36
n.338 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018). He also stated that “[w]ith a reliable market price as the base
line, an arms-length deal at a premium is non-exploitive. By definition, it provides stockholders
with ‘fair compensation for their shares’ defined as ‘what they deserve to receive based on what
would be fairly given to them in an arm’s-length transaction.’” Id. at *40 (quoting DFC, 172
A.3d at 371).
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The Purpose of the Remedy

Exit

Bayless Manning described appraisal remedies as a way of giving
the majority permission to act, rather than protection for the minority. 21
He described this as the “willingness to play for the rebound in history.”22
It also had the effect of allowing dissenters to exit from newly combined
enterprises in which they did not intend to invest, providing some liquidity
in an era when markets were limited in depth and liquidity.23 Manning
described appraisal statutes as “bail-out provisions; when certain events
occur, some shareholders are given a put against the corporation.”24 The
Delaware Chancellor agreed with this analysis in Chicago Corp. v. Munds,
stating that:
[S]tatutes were enacted in state after state which
took from him [the stockholder] the right
theretofore existing to defeat the welding of his
corporation with another. In compensation for
the lost right a provision was written into the
modern statutes giving the dissenting stockholder
the option completely to retire from the enterprise
and receive the value of his stock in money.25
In many of today’s cash mergers, the structure of the merger itself
assures that right.
2.

Value Protection

As Manning famously put it, “permissions and protections have a
way of getting scrambled in corporation law.”26 An appraisal right that
21
See Manning, supra note 18, at 226–27; see also Norman D. Lattin, Remedies of
Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 43 HARV. L. REV. 233, 237 (1931–1932)
(the purpose has been “[t]o placate the dissenting minority and, at the same time, to facilitate the
carrying out of changes of a desirable and extreme sort. . . .”); JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, 4 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 22:24 (3d ed. 2010) (“[I]t appears the
purpose is even more to aid and protect the majority.”).
22
Manning, supra note 18, at 229.
23
Barry M. Wertheimer, The Purpose of the Shareholder’ Appraisal Remedy, 65 TENN.
L. REV. 661, 667 (1997–1998).
24
Manning, supra note 18, at 226.
25
Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. Ch. 1934).
26
Manning, supra note 18, at 228.
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began as permission for majorities to proceed without unanimous consent
ended as a right for minorities to attack deal prices and seek favored
financial treatment. As a result, instead of being permission for the
majority it has morphed into a potent weapon for the minority, and, in
many cases, a late arriving minority—appraisal arbitrageurs—who buy
after the deal announcement and seek a higher price than other
shareholders would receive.
Early statutes authorizing the appraisal remedy did not specify how
value was to be determined, but relied in many cases on outside experts to
serve as appraisers, as did Delaware.27 New Jersey, upon whose statute
Delaware’s was originally based, called for three appraisers to determine
“full market value” of the dissenter’s shares.28 For a long time this meant
“fair market value” in Delaware as well as elsewhere.29 As Manning
observed, “[n]one of the statutes attempts to go much further in assigning
content to the word ‘value,’ though a few seek to reassure the shareholder
by providing that he is entitled to the ‘fair value.’”30 One can assume that
27
J. ERNEST SMITH, THE LAW OF PRIVATE COMPANIES: RELATING TO BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS ORGANIZED UNDER THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAWS OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE, § 56 at 69 (Philadelphia, T. & J. Johnson & Co. 1899); In other cases it was left to
the court. Thompson & Thompson, supra note 17, at 884. See 21 Del. Laws 462–63 (1899).
28
Section 108 of the New Jersey General Corporation Act of 1896, P.L. 1896, p. 312,
P.L. 1902, p. 700, as amended by P.L. 1920, p. 284. Delaware followed this approach in the
General Code of 1899, §56 and in §61 of the General Corporation Law, Del. Rev. Code 1935,
§2093, the latter of which read in part: If any stockholder in any corporation of this State
consolidating or merging as aforesaid, who objected thereto in writing, shall within twenty days
after the date on which the agreement of consolidation or merger has been filed and recorded,
as aforesaid, demand in writing from the corporation resulting from or surviving such
consolidation or merger, payment of his stock, such resulting or surviving corporation shall,
within three months thereafter, pay to him the value of his stock at said date, exclusive of any
element of value arising from the expectation or accomplishment of such consolidation or
merger.
29
Rather than look to markets, fair market value was defined by the courts to mean the
“price which would be agreed upon by a willing seller and a willing buyer under usual and
ordinary circumstances, without any compulsion whatsoever on the seller to sell or the buyer to
buy”. Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 70, n. 1 (Del. 1965) (citing Wilmington
Housing Authority v. Harris, 93 A.2d 518, 521 (1952)). Because of the abstractions that blurred
the importance of evidence of actual transactions, and reliance on various hypothetical models
of value, the powerful evidence of actual market prices was ignored. It was only in 1976 that
“fair value” was added, 60 Del. L. c. 371, §7, and in 1981 the instruction to take “all relevant
factors” into account, 63 Del. L. c. 25, §14 was added. We assume that this was merely a
reflection of the judicial gloss already placed on the statute. See, e.g., Tri-Continental Corp. v.
Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950) (finding that the definition of “value” under the appraisal
statute included “all factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of
value”); Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 348 (Del. Ch.
1973), (hereinafter “duPont”).
30
Manning, supra note 18, at 231.

70

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

VOL. 43

in the early stages of these cases, the appraiser’s judgments were based on
crude tools of valuation, especially in the absence of the more
sophisticated markets of modern times, although where active markets
existed, appraisers may have relied upon them. As we show, primitive
techniques, implicitly conceding considerable uncertainty about the
validity of separate methodologies, continued through much of the
twentieth century. If the purpose of appraisal is to allow shareholders to
escape the consequences of a deal they didn’t bargain for, it becomes clear
that the “value” involved is the value of shares of the firm from which they
exit (now clarified to exclude the anticipated effects of an announced
merger). Modern liquid securities markets now have much more to say
about this subject.
The Delaware Supreme Court recently reiterated this principle,
quoting an earlier opinion to the effect that the purpose of appraisal is to
“make sure that [stockholders] receive fair compensation for their shares
in the sense that it reflects what they deserve to receive based on what
would fairly be given to them in an arm’s-length transaction.”31 All
transactions in efficient markets qualify for that measure; bilateral
negotiations between a single buyer and seller provide indeterminate
results, depending on the skills, preferences, and relative knowledge of
each party.32
3.

Conflicting Interest Protections and Universal Shareholder
Protection

Note that compensating dissenting shareholders for what they give
up protects them, among other things, from the deleterious effects of any
conflicts of interest that might affect the merger terms in favor of a
controlling shareholder. Prior to the merger, shareholders are protected
from conflicts by the fiduciary duties of the officers and board, which are
enforceable in a derivative action. The courts have erred in looking at the
conflicts involved in setting a deal price, because the deal price is not the
issue, and indeed is expressly excluded from consideration by Section
262(h) of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (“Section
31
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 19 n.79
(Del. 2017), citing DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 370–71
(Del. 2017)
32
For a discussion showing that equilibrium may be reached at any point along a
contract curve, see Armen A. Alchian & William R. Allen, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS:
ELEMENTS OF INQUIRY 47–49 (3d ed. 1972).
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262(h)”), which enjoins consideration of “any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation.”33
As Judge Wolcott observed in Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye:
The meaning of the word “value” under this section of the
Corporation Law has never been considered by this court.
* * * The basic concept of value under the appraisal
statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that
which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate
interest in a going concern.34
Other authorities read this as clearly excluding any value created by
or expected from the merger. As Ernest Folk, the author of the report
prepared for the 1967 revision of the Delaware Corporation Act, stated,
“[i]n all instances, shares are to be valued on a going-concern, rather than
on a liquidation basis, ‘by which of course is meant as if the merger had
never been conceived.’” (emphasis added).35
Consider the benefits of this exclusion: (1) it allows dissenters to
exit from any deal they wish, and (2) it protects against an abusive
conflicted interest deal with a controlling shareholder. It has one more
benefit that is perhaps more cogent today: it prevents speculation over
what price a court might set above the deal price, or even at the deal price.
In short, a dissenter would bear the risk (or strong probability) of getting
less than the deal price, but would always get the previous market price,
which would be fair even to appraisal arbitrageurs, provided they paid no
more than the pre-announcement market price (an unrealistic assumption,
but one that precludes post-deal speculation).

33
In re Appraisal of Orchard Enters., No. 5713-CS, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, at *15–
16 (Del. Ch. July, 16, 2012). The error of looking at deal price rather than preceding market
value where a company’s stock is widely followed and continued in In re Appraisal of Dell,
Inc., where Vice Chancellor Laster stated that LBO models of valuation are unreliable because
“[w]hat the sponsor is willing to pay diverges from fair market value because of (i) the financial
sponsor’s need to achieve IRRs of 20% or more to satisfy its own investors and (ii) limits on the
amount of leverage that the company can support and the sponsor can use to finance the deal.”
Any investor that owned Dell stock was aware that Michael Dell was the controlling shareholder,
so the price paid for shares was fair, and the market price before the deal was equally fair - unless
one ignores the exclusion of Section 262(h).
34
Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950).
35
Ernest L. Folk, III, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY
AND ANALYSIS 380 (1972) (citing Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. Ch. 1934))
(citation omitted). Later decisions have ignored the statutory language, either paying lip service
to it or ignoring it entirely. See infra Appendix A.
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Because of abstractions away from true market prices, courts have
generally ignored the command to exclude these elements of value. Where
this provision of Section 262(h) was cited, it was only as a matter of
quotation of the entire section, rather than as providing any guidance.36 In
short, it was only given lip service, not respect. It was not until 1990 that
Chancellor Allen recognized and applied the significance of this provision,
and even then, it remained an exception.37
II.

THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL VALUATION IN APPRAISAL DECISIONS

Here we recount some history of appraisal in Delaware to illustrate
the difficulties facing courts in determining “fair value.” In fairness, the
Delaware courts have not been alone.
A.

Rejecting Market Value

The journey of the Delaware courts away from appraisal on the basis
of market value where a stock was traded actively, began in 1934 with
Chicago Corp. v. Munds.38 There, the Chancellor distinguished the
36

See, e.g., id.; Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 141 (Del. 1980); Glob. GT
LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 507 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010); DFC,
172 A.3d at 364, 368; M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 793 n.6, 795–97 (Del.
1999).
37
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, No. 7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *106 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 19, 1990). See also Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448–
VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *54 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018). It was only within the past decade that
courts sometimes used the statute’s caution, but this was based on theoretical models of value
and theoretical models of the value of synergies, rather than on pre-announcement market prices
to determine value. See, e.g., Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 36 (Del.
Ch. 2007). In Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. 8474, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS
144, 13–14, n.9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1996), reprinted in DEL. J. CORP. L. 1215, the court
obliquely addressed the complications introduced through theoretical measures of value, such
as sales of comparable companies: “[T]his technique masks a complex issue: whether in an
appraisal action ‘fair value’ of the corporation as a going concern, exclusive of [speculative]
elements of value arising from a merger, includes a pro rata share of a control premium. (By
determining a multiple by reference to sales of companies, Mr. Kobak implicitly includes a
control premium). That question is especially interesting when, as here, the corporation itself
has had a controlling block of stock.” Application of Vision Hardware Grp., 669 A.2d 671, 673
(Del. Ch. 1995) held that “the common stock of Better Vision had essentially no financial value
at the time of the merger; the amount paid in the merger represented ‘nuisance value’ and
exceeded the fair value of the public shares prior to the merger.”
38
Chicago Corp., 172 A. at 457. 1929 amendments to the Delaware statute took this
approach. DEL. CODE REV. § 2093 (1935) (enacted 1929). Mary Siegel, Back to the Future:
Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 89–90 n. 46 (1995).
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Delaware statute from New Jersey’s version, which, while based on the
New Jersey act, omitted the words “full market,” and referred only to
“value.”39 In justifying his rejection of reliance on “market value,” the
Chancellor stated:
When it is said that the appraisal which the market puts
upon the value of the stock of an active corporation as
evidenced by its daily quotations, is an accurate, fair
reflection of its intrinsic value, no more than a moment’s
reflection is needed to refute it. There are too many
accidental circumstances entering into the making of
market prices to admit them as sure and exclusive
reflectors of fair value. The experience of recent years is
enough to convince the most casual observer that the
market in its appraisal of values must have been woefully
wrong in its estimates at one time or another within the
interval of a space in time so brief that fundamental
conditions could not possibly have become so altered as
to effect true worth. Markets are known to gyrate in a
single day. The numerous causes that contribute to their
nervous leaps from dejected melancholy to exhilarated
enthusiasm and then back again from joy to grief, need
not be reviewed. It would be most unfortunate indeed
either for the consolidated corporation or for the objecting
stockholder if, on the particular date named by the statute
for the valuation of the dissenter’s stock, viz., the date of
the consolidation, the market should be in one of its
extreme moods and the stock had to be paid for at the price
fixed by the quotations of that day. Even when conditions
are normal and no economic forces are at work unduly to
exalt or depress the financial hopes of man, market
quotations are not safe to accept as unerring expressions
of value. The relation of supply to demand on a given day
as truly affects the market value of a stock as it does of a
commodity; and temporary supply and demand are in turn
affected by numerous circumstances which are wholly

39
Fair market value meant the "price which would be agreed upon by a willing seller
and a willing buyer under usual and ordinary circumstances, without any compulsion whatsoever
on the seller to sell or the buyer to buy". State ex rel. Smith v. 0.15 Acres of Land, 169 A.2d
256, 258 (Del. 1961).
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disconnected from considerations having to do with the
stock’s inherent worth.40
The Munds Court wrote of its distrust of market prices in the wake
of the great stock market crash of 1929. While observers at the time
appeared to have no rational explanation beyond excessive speculation and
stock manipulation that caused a bubble to burst, later scholarship by
Milton Friedman demonstrated that the crash was caused by the Federal
Reserve’s drastic reduction of the money supply.41 A similar explanation
may account for the 2008 drop. After the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in
the Fall of 2008 regulators quickly increased bank capital requirements
from 4% of total assets to 7%.42 Given depressed stock prices, banks chose
not to issue new shares but to reduce loans outstanding, which ultimately
denied credit to businesses that depended on a reliable stream of credit.43
The October 1987 drop, however, which was reversed within two
years,44 had no such obvious explanation.45 One theory is that virtually all
40
Chicago Corp., 172 A. at 455. We now know now that stock prices are a random
walk, depending upon the flow of new information about the companies. Eugene F. Fama,
Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1965, at 55, 56. Relative
prices will change only upon the revelation of new information, which flows constantly and
keeps stock prices in a state of flux. Thus, a statement that a price is "fair" is true at the moment
of purchase but is no guarantee that a security will hold its value relative to the market as news
about the issuer develops.
41
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1867–1960 (1963) (discussing the contraction of economic activity between
1929—1933).
42
See Jack Foster, Changes in US Banking Regulation – Tier 1 Capital Requirements,
N.Y. INST. FIN., https://www.nyif.com/articles/changes-in-us-banking-regulation-tier-1-capitalrequirements (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
43
Tim Congdon and Steve H. Hanke, More Bank Capital Could Kill the Economy,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-bank-capital-could-kill-theeconomy-1489446254.
44
Adam Hewison, It Takes a Long Time for a Market Recovery, INO (Oct. 13, 2008),
https://www.ino.com/blog/2008/10/it-takes-a-long-time-for-a-market-recovery/#.W8jpGntKjcs
(“When the market crashed Oct. 19, 1987, sending the Dow Jones industrial average down 508
points to 1,738.34, the blue chips had lost 938 points, or 36.1 percent, since reaching a thenrecord close of 2,722.42 on Aug. 25, 1987. It took just over 15 months for the Dow to get back
to its pre-crash level, and almost two years to the day — Aug. 24, 1989 — to reach a new closing
high, 2,734.64.”)
45
Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 365–
th
66 (6 ed. 2000); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 915–16 (1989). Recent work shows that once a
decline began, the computers of institutional investors began to sell out their own holdings.
Unfortunately, this massive simultaneous selling only exacerbated the decline. John A. Prestbo,
A Surprising Legacy of the 1987 Crash: the ETF, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-surprising-legacy-of-the-1987-crash-the-etf-1507515300. See
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stocks fell in proportion to their beta factors, thus retaining relative
relationships to each other, but that theory only avoids the larger issue of
whether stocks were fairly priced with respect to other available
investments. Since we can only value homogeneous things comparatively
by their prices, it is an impossible task.46 More importantly, however,
especially for an individual stockholder, a decline in the price of a stock
he or she owns does not significantly reduce the investment alternatives
for that investor, because all other shares have been similarly reduced in
price.47 We cannot say the same for an investor who wants to sell shares
to buy a home, however.48 What we can say is that stock market declines
create a “wealth effect” where individuals feel less well off, and tend to
curb some expenditures, and reduce the market value of the objects of
those purchases.49 In that sense, all investment assets rise and fall
together.50 So the premise of distrust for market valuations was flawed in
Munds, as we now know, but persists to this day.
The Munds opinion introduced the requirement that the dissenter be
paid the “intrinsic value” of his shares, a term that has created confusion
for generations. It should be noted that the court’s “moment’s reflection”
by a “casual observer” has now been replaced by generations of careful
theory and evidence of markets and valuation by brilliant, and in some
cases, Nobel Laureate financial economists, validating efficient capital
markets in the scientific literature, but not in the courts.51 The notion that
markets must be wrong on any given day is a common one, often held by
such “casual observers.” It persisted in the Delaware Court of Chancery
as late as 2016.52 It appears to exist in the decisions in other jurisdictions
also Ben Eisen et al., The Dow’s Darkest Day, 30 Years Later, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2017, at
B12.
46
See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985) (discussing, among other
things, that markets are efficient, but only in relatively).
47
Fischel, supra note 45, at 914–17. One qualification is required – all traded securities
move in the direction of the overall market only to the extent of each stock’s beta – its correlation
with the market.
48
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 46, at 765, 768–69.
49
See generally James M. Poterba, Stock Market Wealth and Consumption, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP. 99 (2000).
50
We will not belabor the truth of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) here. See
Brealey & Myers, supra note 45, at 375 (“Lesson 6: Seen One Stock, Seen Them All”).
51
See generally JAMES H. LORIE, ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1985). The list of Nobel laureates includes Eugene F. Fama, Lars Peter
Hansen, Robert J. Shiller, Robert C. Merton, Myron S. Scholes, Harry M. Markowitz, Merton
H. Miller, William F. Sharpe, Franco Modigliani and James Tobin.
52
In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. 10107–CB, 2016 WL 3753123 (Del. Ch.
July 8, 2016), rev’d sub nom. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346,
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as well.53 This is a classic example of the Nirvana fallacy of comparing
an imperfect world to a nonexistent perfect one—which assumes biased
and polarized experts are wiser judges of value than informed market
participants using their own funds (who have their own financial
experts).54 Given the strong preference for expert testimony or deal prices
over solid market evidence prior to a deal’s announcement in Delaware
appraisal cases, one is tempted to conclude that the Delaware courts have
rarely seen a market that they liked or trusted.
B.

The Analogy to Liquidation

As previously noted, the origins of appraisal lie in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s original analogy to a corporate liquidation, creating a
basis for departure from unanimous consent requirements.55 While
Delaware has not expressed the same analogy, the Delaware Supreme
Court rejected market value as a measure of value of shares in TriContinental Corp. v. Battye, with the court defining the value of shares,
not as the publicly traded price, but “the value of the stockholder’s
368–70 (Del. 2017) (where the Court of Chancery was reversed for rejecting market values in
part as unreliable due to risks and uncertainties about a company’s future caused by regulatory
threats). On reversal, the Supreme Court, while noting that the market price of DFC varied
widely as it reflected new risks, only required an explanation of how much weight to give the
deal price that was supported by the record. See also In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., No. 9322VCL, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, at *106–08 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016) (citing market myopia
focused on short-term results and a supposed “anchoring bias,” despite numerous analysts
valuing the company and its plans, and despite shopping the company to sophisticated financial
buyers). This was rejected on appeal. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund
Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 27–28 (Del. 2017).
53
Fischel, supra note 45, at n.3; see also Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of
Modern Finance Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 22 tbl.5 (2003)
(illustrating methodologies to calculate appraisal valuations accepted by non-Delaware courts).
54
Fischel, supra note 45, at 915. While experts may not have intentional bias, litigants
do, and we can be certain that no expert who arrives at an unfavorable valuation for his or her
client will be employed at trial.
55
Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42, 49 (Pa. 1858). In part the analogy was
to an action in partition among co-owners of real property. The liquidation exception to
unanimous consent lay in the concept of frustration of the purpose of an agreement, described
by Morawetz as a corporation “becom[ing] hopelessly insolvent, or unable to carry on its
business except at a loss . . . .” MORAWETZ, supra note 16, § 412, at 390. Note that current
bankruptcy law allows individual creditors who dissent from a proposed corporate
reorganization to block confirmation of a plan of reorganization only if the plan provides them
with less than the liquidation value of their claims. Dissent by a minority does not entitle
individual dissenting creditors to share in the firm’s going concern value in excess of the
liquidation value or to participate in the gains to the going concern value that flow from the
reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012).

2018

THE DEATH OF APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE:
ENDING WINDFALLS FOR DEAL DISSENTERS

77

proportionate interest” as “the true or intrinsic value of his stock . . . .” 56
The court did not define intrinsic value, but discussed all imaginable
elements that a court might consider, in essence giving courts wide
discretion and no guidance about intrinsic value.57 Nor was there ever a
mention of the relative materiality of various measures of value, a term
that remains missing to this day.58
While one can infer that in this case of a closed-end mutual fund
“intrinsic value” means to value the stock at the current market value of
the fund’s investments rather than the typically discounted value of the
fund (presumably on account of agency costs), none of this was explained
by the court. The idea that market value is an unfair measure misses the
point that most investors in closed-end funds invested at a discount
reflecting these agency costs, so getting out at a discount reflecting these
same costs is both fair and exactly what they bargained for. Obviously,
there are agency costs in any mutual fund, part of which an investor can
avoid only by doing his own stock-picking, which carries its own often
higher costs.59
The term “intrinsic” has never been defined by the court, except
perhaps tautologically as “going concern value,” which itself the court has
never defined in economic terms.60 In Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij,
56

Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del 1950).
“The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is
entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a
going concern. By value of the stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise
is meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the merger. In
determining what figure represents this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and the courts must
take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of
value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise
and any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of the date of merger
and which throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent
to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered by
the agency fixing the value." Id.
58
The Dell court did refer to probative value, however. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob.
Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 31, 35 (Del. 2017).
59
The loss of scale economies of mutual funds raises information search costs and
diversification costs for individual investors. Index funds provide a different model with much
reduced costs, but do not engage in attempting to pick winners and losers. It should be noted
that all firms are affected by agency costs. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).
60
Going concern value is typically defined as the value of a company as a going concern,
as opposed to its liquidation value, which simply values the firm’s assets without assessing how
their assembly might lead to greater earning value for the firm. Going-Concern Value,
57
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the Supreme Court conceded (correctly) that “going-concern asset value
is comparatively an ethereal concept, and the appraisal thereof is a highly
speculative and conjectural process.”61 The use of this ethereal term
continued in Smith v. Van Gorkom, where the court faulted the board for
being “uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company.” 62 Chief
Justice Strine has recently tried to put lipstick on this financial pig by
calling it a “jurisprudential” concept, without further detail about what that
means.63
Indeterminacy has been an ongoing problem in Delaware
corporate law.64 Multipart tests with weighting left to the discretion of
each judge only exacerbate this problem. Stephen Bainbridge’s recent
paper reviews the various interest group explanations for this
phenomenon, and while he credits some of them, he adds one of his own:
that “all judges have a powerful self-interest in maximizing their
reputation. . . .” and that “the mandatory indeterminacy of Delaware’s
judicially created corporate law likewise follows from judicial concern for
reputation.”65 To paraphrase, the prominence of the judicial role is
maximized under uncertainty because of the necessity to litigate similar
issues with small distinctions repeatedly, and to turn to these judges time
and again. Determinations of “intrinsic value” have become a magnet for
such litigation. One might term “intrinsic value” little more than a judicial
conceit rather than a clear principle for private compliance that is feasible
to operationalize. Albert Choi and Eric Talley have argued for the current
practice, on the theory that both parties to a merger will be influenced by
the expected appraisal valuation.66 This ignores the indeterminacy of a
INVESTOPEDIA
(last
visited
June
23,
2017),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/going_concern_value.asp.
61
Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 72 (Del. 1965).
62
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985). Daniel Fischel characterized
this decision as "surely one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law . . . ." Daniel
R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. L. 1437, 1455
(1985).
63
DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P, 172 A.3d 367 (Del. 2017),
cited in Dell, 177 A.3d at 36.
64
William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s
Continuing Success, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 15–17 (2009).
65
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interest Group Analysis of Delaware Law: The Corporate
Opportunity Doctrine as Case Study, 22–24 UCLA Sch. of Law, Law—Econ. Research Paper
No.
17-01
(Feb.
22,
2017),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2894577.
66
Albert Choi and Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, 35 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888420 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2888420.
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multi-part test with no guidelines for weighting. Our evidence reveals how
difficult predicting appraisal valuation has been, and how generally
profitable appraisal arbitrage has become.67 Scholars of law and
economics have mistakenly focused on the deal, ignoring the fact that the
statute instructs courts to ignore the deal and focus on the value of the
company exclusive of the effects of anticipation or realization of the deal.
This leads to ex post experts second-guessing the ex-ante experts
employed by selling firm directors who must deal with the realities of the
existing market.
C.

Leaving the Term “Value” Open

As previously discussed, Delaware’s early statute did not specify
how value was to be determined.68 The use of the open term “value” surely
was intended to include the long-standing “fair market value,” in Delaware
as well as elsewhere.69 In an era before large volumes of trades and a
constant flow of material information about companies and large numbers
of financial analysts, one can only speculate about what methods
appraisers employed. In more primitive times, some courts accepted par
value of shares as their value.70 In Chicago Corp. v. Munds, under such a

They argue that “the appraisal right helps protect against unfair and inefficient transfers
to lower valuing buyers . . . .” See also Audra Boone et al., Merger Negotiations in the shadow
of Judicial Appraisal, Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 381 (June 11, 2018), available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039040 and Charles Korsmo & Minor
Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 279, 322 (2016). But see
Paul G. Mahoney & Mark Weinstein, The Merger Remedy and Merger Premiums, 1 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 239, 242 (1999) (reviewing pre-arbitrage evidence and finding no differences
because of access to appraisal). But after an efficient search for the highest bidder, where is a
higher bidder to be found? Choi and Talley argue that the sale price anticipates judicial treatment
of appraisal. Our difficulty here is that the appraisal evidence of expert testimony shows wide,
some might say wild, variations, that do not match or predict judicial outcomes. See Appendix
A. In effect, this makes appraisal something of a lottery, albeit one with a virtually guaranteed
payoff above the risk-free rate. More fundamentally, these authors ignore the limits of the
statute.
67
One notable exception is In re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc., 2017 WL 2334852
(Del. Ch. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Merlin v. Sws Group, 2018 Del. LEXIS 77, where the court
found a fair value of $6.38 per share, while the deal price was $6.92. See also ACP Master, Ltd.
v. Sprint Corp., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, 2017 WL 3105858, where the court found a fair
value of $2.13 per share compared to a deal price of $5.00, on the basis of a discounted cash
flow analysis.
68
See discussion supra p. 2.
69
Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 70, 72 (Del. 1965).
70
Barnett v. Philadelphia Market Co., 67 A. 912, 913 (Pa. 1907).
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statute, the appraisers “took evidence upon the earnings of the corporation,
its prospects, reproduction value, asset value, market quotations, etc.”71
While there was a trading market for the shares, the court noted
approvingly that “[t]he appraisers, having made a full examination of the
status of the company and its prospects, are in a better position to gauge
the fair value of the stock than the outside public."72 In 1934, when
investors were licking their wounds, at the onset of federal securities
regulation and disclosure requirements, there might have been a grain of
truth in this, but that day is long past, in the era of efficient capital markets
dominated by sophisticated institutional investors and high speed traders
that arbitrage away tiny price differences between markets. By the 1950s,
this rejection of market prices was accepted doctrine, and valuation
somehow morphed from a question of fact for the appraisers to become a
question of law for the court to determine—oddly described by today’s
Supreme Court as “jurisprudence.”73
D.

Edging Bets: Consider “Everything”

What began as a search for the holy grail of “intrinsic value”
allowed consideration of virtually anything—sometimes, but not always,
including market value. The weighting of these factors when courts
exercised their discretion was wildly inconsistent, a problem that
continues today, albeit in a somewhat more modern form.74 The one thing
it did not permit was consideration of expected future earnings, on the
basis that this was speculative, and not based on existing facts.75 This
approach excludes the evidence most relied upon by investors, who are not
buying past earnings, and do not believe that the past always predicts the
future. The duPont case was perhaps the most egregious example. A film
maker had just discovered new value in its fully amortized film library due
to the onset of television’s voracious appetite for new material, including
71

Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 456 (Del. Ch. 1934).
Id. at 456.
73
Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 348 (Del. Ch.
1973), aff’d 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975); DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P, 172
A.3d 346, 368 (Del. 2017).
74
Comment, Valuation of Dissenters’ Stock under Appraisal Statutes, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
1453, 1469 (1966), shows Delaware Block allocations to market value ranging between 25 and
45%, to asset value between 20 and 50%, and earnings value between 25 and 80%. Similar
variances appeared in a later study, Note, 30 OKL L. REV. 629 (1977).
75
See, e.g., duPont, 312 A.2d at 348–49. For a criticism of the former “Delaware
Block” methodology, see David Cohen, Comment: Valuation in the Context of Share Appraisal,
34 EMORY L.J. 117 (1985).
72
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full length feature films.76 Rather than capitalize expected future earnings,
as markets would, and did, the court approved a capitalization based solely
on an average of the past years’ earnings, which had grown steadily from
$3.32 per share to $8.02 in the previous five years, thus failing to use the
trend to make projections of future earnings.77 The court declined to
include the earnings value of the fully amortized film library in its asset
calculation, in effect ignoring the “going concern value.”78
The confusion created by considering “asset value” is perhaps best
exemplified by Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, where the Supreme
Court admitted that it had perhaps confused the meaning of “asset value”
with its own pronouncements, while at the same time denying that they
were in error, or unclear.79 The court conceded that in valuing stock on a
going concern basis, it was not clear whether assets’ value was to be
determined on a going concern basis as opposed to fair market value.80 In
the particular case this was important because the market value of the
assets apparently was greater if the company were liquidated and the assets
put to an alternative and more valuable use. While the court cited its own
cases that assets were to be valued on a going concern basis, and not on a
liquidation basis,81 it then proceeded to claim (correctly) that “goingconcern asset value is comparatively an ethereal concept, and the appraisal
thereof is a highly speculative and conjectural process. We are satisfied
that fair market value, so well formulated in the law of eminent domain,
furnishes a more concrete and workable rule for appraisers, lawyers, and
judges (emphasis added).”82 Then in the next breath the court took back
much of what it had just concluded, citing Fletcher:
Net asset value is entitled to weight, but it must be
remembered that an appraisal is not a liquidation, and that
the stock must be appraised on a going concern basis with
76

See duPont, 312 A.2d at 347–49.
Id. at 348.
78
Id. at 351. Following Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67 (Del. 1965), the
court held that “any allowance for the earning power of the assets . . . is best left to the court’s
consideration of earnings as an independent element of stock value.” But of course, the only
consideration was retrospective, where averaging included periods when the film library was
not being fully utilized.
79
Poole, 243 A.2d at 70.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 70–71 (citing Heller v. Munsingwear, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 593, 98 A.2d 774
(1953)); Sporburg v. City Specialty Stores, 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (1956); Levin v.
Midland Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 194 A.2d 50 (1963).
82
Poole, 243 A.2d at 72.
77
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the possibility in different cases that the value of the stock
may be substantially above or below net asset value or
break-up value. The nature of the business, the nature of
the assets, their liquidity, and profitable use, are factors
bearing upon the weight to be given to net asset value.83
One can only speculate what this wisdom might have meant in TriContinental Corp. v. Battye if it had been considered carefully. A closedend investment fund rarely sells at its net asset value, largely because of
agency costs, including the brokerage fees of trading and the costs of
analysts.84 Liquidation would nearly always produce a higher net asset
value. How does one reconcile these values? The cost of voluntary exit
for an investor includes search costs for new stocks and the brokerage
costs involved in reinvestment and leaves the investor with less
diversification unless another fund (with its own agency costs) is chosen.
There is a lesson here (ignored by the courts); investors purchase shares in
closed-end companies recognizing the agency costs and recognizing that
an exit will be at the market value of the fund’s shares, rather than at full
liquidation value. Apparently, investors believe this is “fair,” since they
were on notice of these facts at the time of purchase and are willing to pay
a price for managed diversification.
While Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., rejected the rigidity of Francis I.
duPont and allowed judicial admission of evidence based on modern
methods of valuation, it continued the hedging process, thus minimizing
the impact of real market values.85 The court stated that all the older
83

Id. (citing 15 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (perm. ed.) 305)).
Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE
L.J. 367, 412–13, n. 142 (1994) (citing, inter alia, Abraham Abraham et al., Does Sentiment
Explain Closed-End Fund Discounts? Evidence from the Bond Funds, 28 FIN. REV. 607 (1993)
(recounting long-standing puzzle of closed-end fund discounts and arguing that existence of
small premiums for closed-end bond funds suggests that discounts are not due to systematic
risk)); Kenneth J. Boudreaux, Discounts and Premiums on Closed-End Mutual Funds: A Study
in Valuation, 28 J. FIN. 515 (1973); James A. Brickley & James S. Schallheim, Lifting the Lid
on Closed-End Investment Companies: A Case of Abnormal Returns, 20 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 107 (1985). For a general discussion of agency costs, see Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 59.
85
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Two commentators argue that
Weinberger was the beginning of the shift to an emphasis on a fair deal price (not just above the
pre-bid market), which has spread beyond conflict of interest transactions to all deals. Mahoney
& Weinstein, supra note 66, at 240. We are less certain, since the phrase “intrinsic value”
appears much earlier. See, e.g., Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 150–51 (1934); TriContinental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del 1950); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
866 (Del. 1985).
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elements must also be considered.86 In Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc.,
the court approved a weighted value based upon the discounted value of
earnings at 75% and book value of assets (an irrelevant historical figure)
of 25%.87 This only encouraged the confusion which continues to this day.
Cases employing net asset value as one measure persist.88 Older cases
employed what appear to be random weightings of asset value, market
value, earnings value and in a few cases, dividend value.89 That process
persists.90 In DFC Global, Vice Chancellor Bouchard gave equal weight
to a discounted cash flow value of $13.10, the comparable companies
analysis offered by DFC Global’s expert, and the deal price. On appeal
Chief Justice Strine stated, “the Court of Chancery must exercise its
considerable discretion while also explaining, with reference to the
economic facts before it and corporate finance principles, why it is
according a certain weight to a certain indicator of value.”91 While
emphasizing the importance of judicial discretion in weighing “all relevant
factors,” the opinion ignored the crucial importance and overwhelming
materiality of the pre-deal stock price, while ironically reciting that
“averaging of market prices on the last trading day before the
announcement of a merger will reflect the fair market price.”92 This error
was repeated in Justice Valihura’s opinion in Dell.93 Does this mean that
fair market price cannot be fair value?
“By value of the stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise is
meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the merger. In determining
what figure represents this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and the courts must take into
consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value.
Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and
any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of the date of merger and
which throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an
inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered by the
agency fixing the value.” 457 A.2d at 713 (quoting Battye, 74 A.2d, at 72).
87
C.A. No. 7499, 1989 WL 17438, at *3, reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1095.
88
Ng v. Heng Sang Realty Corp., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, at *24; Highfields Capital,
Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Ch. 2007); Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event
Driven Master Fund, Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 36 (Del. 2017) (quoting Battye, 74 A.2d at 72).
89
Note, The Dissenting Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKL. L. REV. 629, 640–
41 (1977).
90
In re Appraisal of DFC Global Inc., No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123 at *14–15
(Del. Ch. July 8, 2016); Id. at *2.
91
Is this asking the trial court to explain the inexplicable? DFC Global Corp., v.
Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 388 (Del. 2017).
92
DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. 172 A.3d at 365 n.95 citing
EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 262.10
at 9—229 (6th ed. 2017)..
93
In re Appraisal of Dell at *48 (“[The statute] vests the Chancellor and Vice
Chancellors with significant discretion to consider ‘all relevant factors’ and determine the going
concern value of the underlying company.”) citing Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP
86
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Chief Justice Strine correctly dismissed prima facie reliance on the
deal price as the best estimate of value, as having no basis in the statute,
“which gives the Court of Chancery in the first instance the discretion to
‘determine the fair value of the shares’ by taking into account all relevant
factors.”94 Here, the Chief Justice confuses relevance and materiality,
which has to do with the weight (probative value) to be attached to a
particular piece of evidence. In view of the statutory exclusion of Section
262(h), the truly irrelevant and immaterial evidence is the deal price itself.
He then went on to note the length and openness of the seller’s search, the
lack of conflicts, and said that under these conditions “economic principles
suggest that the best evidence of fair value was the deal price.”95 As the
court stated, “the market’s collective judgment of the effect of regulatory
risk . . . is more likely to be correct than any individual’s guess. When
the collective judgment involved, as it did here, not just the views of
company stockholders, but also those of potential buyers of the entire
company . . . there is more, not less, reason to give weight to the market’s
view of an important factor.”96 The only problem is that given Section
262(h)’s exclusion, the relevant time for respect of market prices was
before the deal was announced or anticipated.
The opinion observes that DFC’s argument on appeal in favor of a
judicial presumption in favor of deal value where the price was the product
of sufficient market conditions was not presented fairly to the Court of
Chancery. The Supreme Court could have relied on this ground to reject
the argument on appeal, but instead gratuitously rejected it on other
grounds, based largely on precedent, and a judicial clinging to its
discretionary powers first generated in the 1930s in Tri-Continental Corp
v. Battye. The opinion only questioned the discretion of the particular
weighting, not that the Court of Chancery failed to give the deal price
sufficient weight or explain why it relied on other factors. There was no
mention of exclusion of anticipated or realized effects of the deal on value,
thus ignoring Section 262(h)’s exclusionary command. Similarly, in Dell
the court did not insist on the deal price or the pre-bid market price as
determinative.97

(Golden Telecom II), 11 A.3d 214, 217–18 (Del. 2010); DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 348;
Id. at 349.
94
DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 349 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
See Dell, Inc., v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del.
2017); DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 352.
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The DFC opinion notes the efficiency of the trading market for
DFC’s shares, both in the size of the float and the responsiveness of its
stock price to various regulatory initiatives, as did the Dell opinion. A
stock price chart documented the volatility of price in view of both high
leverage and successive regulatory risks. But the Supreme Court’s opinion
ignored these facts, and, in discussing the possible unreliability of deal
prices, ignored the widely accepted reliability of market prices.98 Most of
the Supreme Court opinion was devoted to a detailed analysis of the Court
of Chancery’s fair value analysis, and recites at length the positions of the
experts, their disagreements, and the trial court’s resolution of these
differences. We can only wonder why experts who apply models based
on accurate market descriptions can be allowed to apply assumptions the
market has apparently rejected, such as the beta, the equity premium,
expected earnings growth and others. The Dell opinion was more
skeptical of expert opinions on value, although it left it to the experts to
provide evidence on the size of the deduction for deal synergies.99
E.

Finally Recognizing Market Value

We began writing this article as an unalloyed criticism of the court’s
lack of recognition of market value as the best measure of the statutory
command to exclude anticipated or realized effects of the merger. Until
February of 2018, this was a fair assessment, in our view. But Vice
Chancellor Laster’s recent opinion in Arubahas required an amendment to
our thesis. Whether it will stand up on appeal remains open as we write
this, but its logic is so powerful that it would be difficult to reverse it,
although it is possible that the Delaware Supreme Court might continue to
recite its mantra about the courts’ discretion. As Vice Chancellor Laster
wrote, in the context of discussing dissenters’ complaints about whether
the negotiators had obtained the highest possible price, or were
compromised:

98
“But, not only do we see no license in the statute for creating a presumption that the
resulting price in such a situation is the ‘exclusive,’ ‘best,’ or ‘primary’ evidence of fair value,
we do not share DFC’s confidence in our ability to craft, on a general basis, the precise preconditions that would be necessary to invoke a presumption of that kind.” DFC Global Corp.,
172 A.3d at 366.
99
The court noted at petitioners’ expert asserted fair value was more than twice the deal
price, Dell Inc., 172 A.3d at *26–27, which the trial court noted lacked credibility on its face.
Id. at *69–70. At the same time, without reference to pre-bid market values, the trial court was
charged with determining the value of synergies. Id. at *39.
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In a scenario where the underlying market price is
reliable, competition and negotiation become secondary.
Under these circumstances, an arm’s-length deal at a
premium over the market is non-exploitive.
By
definition, it gives stockholders ‘what would fairly be
given to them in an arm’s-length transaction.’100
III.

HOW MODERN
VALUATION

FINANCIAL

KNOWLEDGE

HAS

CHANGED

A. Efficient Capital Markets
We now turn to the vast body of knowledge about how financial
markets operate and set prices to reflect the current consensus about
value.101 Here we will only summarize much of this knowledge, to set the
stage for answering the question of, in terms of Delaware law, what does
“fair value” mean?
Theories and evidence about investor choices and behavior center on
how participants in capital markets process new information.102 It would
be redundant to repeat all of the evidence in support of what Michael
Jensen has called one of the best established propositions in all of the
social sciences: the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis.103 Beginning
with research that established that stock price movements are
unpredictable, researchers were able to infer that stock markets were
efficient in a weak form—that nothing in the sequence of past stock prices
enabled us to predict future price movements.104 From that, researchers
proceeded to test stronger claims of market efficiency. The semi-strong
100

Aruba, 2018 WL 922139 at *95–96.
The DFC opinion made brief reference to this consensus. DFC Global Corp., at 373
n.144 (“In an efficient market you can trust prices, for they impound all available information
about the value of each security.” (quoting RICHARD A. BREALEY ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 214 (2008)). However, the Dell court concluded that the market for the
stock was semi-strong form efficient. Dell Inc., 172 A.3d at *7.
102
See William Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. UNIV.
L. REV. 863 (1987).
103
Michael Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4, No. 2
MIDLAND J. CORP. FIN. 6, 11 (Summer, 1986). For extensive early surveys, see, e.g., Eugene
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970);
Irwin Friend, The Economic Consequences of the Stock Market, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 212 (1972);
Sanford J. Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Traders Have
Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573 (1976).
104
LORIE, ET AL., supra note 51, at 70–79.
101

2018

THE DEATH OF APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE:
ENDING WINDFALLS FOR DEAL DISSENTERS

87

form asserted that all publicly available information about issuers was
reflected in stock prices, while the strong form asserted that all such
information, public or not, was reflected.105 The Supreme Court in DFC
Global noted the widespread acceptance (and evidence in support) of this
learning:106
Market prices are typically viewed as superior to other
valuation techniques because, unlike, e.g., a single
person’s discounted cash flow model, the market price
should distill the collective judgment and wisdom of the
many based on all the publicly available information
about a given company and the value of its shares.
Indeed, the relationship between market valuation and
fundamental valuation has been strong historically. As
one textbook puts it, “[i]n an efficient market you can trust
prices, for they impound all available information about
the value of each security.” More pithily: “For many
purposes no formal theory of value is needed. We can
take the market’s word for it.” But, a single person’s own
estimates of the cash flows are just that, a good faith
estimate by a single, reasonably informed person to
predict the future [subject to all the perils of bias and
inaccurate assumptions shown by competing experts in
appraisal cases, as demonstrated in Exhibit A107]. Thus, a
singular discounted cash flow model is often most helpful
only when there isn’t an observable market price.108

105
Id. at 71. We note in passing that the strong form has not been widely accepted, while
the semi-strong form has.
106
DFC Global Inc., v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 369–70 (Del. 2017); In
re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538 at *24 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016). Vice Chancellor
Laster dismissed market prices by quoting then Vice Chancellor Strine to the effect that “even
for purposes of determining the value of individual shares, where the stock market is typically
thick and liquid, the proponents of the efficient capital markets hypothesis no longer make the
strong-form claim that the market price actually determines fundamental value; at most they
make the semi-strong claim that market prices reflect all available information and are efficient
at incorporating new information.” He ignored the fact that Dell had been widely publicizing its
plans and projections, and mentions no inside information concealed from the public.
107
JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES,
AND NATIONS (Doubleday & Anchor eds., 2004).
108
DFC Global Corp., v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 369–70 (Del. 2017).
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For these reasons, corporate finance theory reflects a belief that if
an asset—such as the value of a company as reflected in the trading value
of its stock—can be subject to close examination and bidding by many
humans with an incentive to estimate its future cash flows value, the
resulting collective judgment as to value is likely to be highly informative
and that, all estimators having equal access to public information, the
likelihood of outguessing the market over time and building a portfolio of
stocks beating it is slight.109
B. Exploring the Efficient Capital Market Paradox
Despite the widespread acceptance of stock market efficiency, the
Supreme Court remains reluctant to treat this evidence with the respect
called for by its power. The DFC opinion gives two reasons: (1) the
statute: “We decline to engage in that act of creation, which in our view
has no basis in the statutory text, which gives the Court of Chancery in the
first instance the discretion to ‘determine the fair value of the shares’ by
taking into account ‘all relevant factors’”; and (2) the singular importance
of judicial discretion.110 At the same time, the opinion rejects the rules of
evidence that require consideration of the materiality of evidence and the
weight to be accorded to it as well as its relevance. Later, the opinion
attempts to explain why the only material evidence of value is to be
discounted: “the definition of fair value used in appraisal cases is a
jurisprudential concept that has certain nuances that neither an economist
nor market participant would usually consider . . . .”111 One can only
wonder why, if no one in the real world considers these immaterial
elements of value, the courts feel that they must do so. Moreover, the
opinion does not identify these nuances, or the role materiality should play
in weighing evidence. No explanation is given why market prices should
not be trusted whenever available, nor of what nuances the court refers to.
We attempt to explore some possibilities below. Without some specific
“nuances,” lawyers and lower court judges are left to speculate. This
indeterminacy has been criticized by one of us in other settings.112 It leads
to the uncertainty created by courts of equity that have long been criticized

109

See, e.g., BRADFORD CORNELL, CORPORATE VALUATION: TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE
APPRAISAL AND DECISION MAKING 35–38 (Amy Hollands et al. eds., 1993).
110
DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. 172 A.3d at 346.
111
Id. at 367.
112
Carney & Shepherd, supra note 3, at 11.
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for being as arbitrary as the length of “a Chancellor’s foot.”113 And so
indeed equity appears to be in appraisal cases.
Here we address the lingering suspicions that markets do not always
price every stock efficiently, as we noted above in discussing the efficient
market paradox. Gilson and Kraakman used the example of issuance of
an innovative security, where no one other than the issuer may fully
understand its value at the time of issue.114 One common example is the
post-market price reaction to an initial public offering of common stock,
where prices typically rise after the IPO, as investor uncertainty is
generally assuaged with reactions of more knowledgeable investors and
subsequent information.
When an issuer first announces such an innovative
security, all traders will be uncertain about its worth.
Although the issuer may make good-faith representations
about value, most traders will discount these as selfinterested puffery. Absent convincing assurances, the
initial pricing of the innovative security will be left to the
uninformed trading mechanism, which will tend to
"undervalue" it relative to the information possessed by
the good-faith issuer -- but not, of course, relative to the
aggregate forecasts of the uninformed traders. Thus, the
security's uninformed equilibrium price will be "biased,"
and relatively inefficient. Efficiency is possible only if the
issuer succeeds in making its representations credible, or
if an enterprising trader independently acquires the key
facts that establish their accuracy. In the first case,
subsequent price equilibration would proceed rapidly
through the universally informed or professionally
informed trading mechanisms; in the second, it would
proceed more slowly through derivatively informed
trading.115
113
John Selden, TABLE TALK 43 (Pollock ed., 1927) (“Equity is a roguish thing. For
Law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according to the conscience of him that
is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'T is all one as if they should make
the standard for the measure we call a "foot" a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure
would this be! One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot.
'T is the same thing in the Chancellor's conscience.”).
114
Ronald Gilson & Renier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549, 585 (1984).
115
Id.
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This market inefficiency can exist in various settings. One is where
markets fail to dive deeply into research about a company to predict
accurately its future earnings and profits. Warren Buffet is notable
because he ignores the short term variance risk measured by beta and used
by finance expert witnesses, to focus on longer term prospects, which he
calls “focus investing.”116 In another example, one of the authors was a
director of a biotechnology company, Pharmasset, Inc., with several
complex compounds with the potential to treat (or cure) one or more viral
diseases.117 While the company made regular releases of definitive
clinical testing information when available, management and the directors
generally believed that the company’s stock was undervalued. Many
analysts seemed superficial in their work, and when one wrote a report
with a detailed analysis of the risks and potential of a lead compound that
the CEO said he could have written, the stock moved quickly upward. But
complexity and uncertainty continued to dog the stock’s price, until one
sophisticated company working in the antiviral area, Gilead Sciences,
made a first bid that triggered a diligent search for the best possible price.
That price was an 89% premium over the pre-announcement market price,
which was based on a relatively recent announcement of the latest clinical
test results.118 Upon announcement, the buyer’s stock price fell, upon a
consensus that it was paying too much.119 The buyer ultimately priced the
FDA approved drug at $1,000 per pill ($84,000 per treatment), over twice
the seller’s best estimates of its price ($36,000), which created a stir in
Congress and the press.120 At the end, who could say the acquisition price
was too low? In hindsight, neither the market nor the seller’s officers or
directors fully understood the full commercial potential value of the
seller’s compound. Forbes magazine later called Gilead’s purchase of
Pharmasset for $11 billion “one of the best pharma acquisitions ever.”121
116

See, e.g., ROBERT G. HAGSTROM, THE WARREN BUFFETT PORTFOLIO (1999).
See GILDEAD SCIENCES TO ACQUIRE PHARMASSET, INC. FOR $11 BILLION (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/882095/000119312511317733/d259746dex991.htm.
118
Jon "DRJ" Najarian, Pharmasett pops on Gilead takeover, YAHOO (Nov. 21,
2011), https://www.yahoo.com/news/Pharmasset-pops-Gilead-optmonster-2480362095.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
119
Id.; "Grading Pharma in 2013", FORBES, December 31, 2013. Pharmasset’s
experienced legal adviser assured the board that the company would be sued, given the
uncertainty of the application of Delaware law to such transactions, and two spurious suits
claiming Revlon violations followed.
120
Russ Britt, Gilead’s high pricing of Sovaldi draws inquiry from Senate committee,
MARKETWATCH,
(July
11,
2014), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/healthexchange/2014/07/11/gileads-high-pricing-of-sovaldi-draws-inquiry-from-senate-committee/.
121
Matthew Herper, Grading Pharma In 2013: 16 Drug Companies Ranked, FORBES,
(Dec. 31, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/12/31/grading-pharma-in2013-16-drug-companies-ranked/#4b92bd5b3f09.
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Who could have known this purchase was a bargain? Only those with
perfect foresight, which did not include one of these authors, experienced
pharmaceutical officers and directors, and experienced financial advisors.
How could a court know this?122
A modest regard for criticisms of market efficiency compels us to
suggest that the pre-announcement market price should be presumed to be
the best evidence of fair value, with a heavy burden on those who would
challenge it—not met in DFC Global or Dell. As Fischel has stated,
“market prices are superior to other methods of valuation when market
prices are available . . . .”123
IV.

THE COURTS’ REACTIONS—TOO LITTLE AND TOO FAR

We have noted that the Supreme Court’s DFC Global and Dell
decisions have edged toward acceptance of deal values as the primary, if
not exclusive, means of measuring corporate value, while still retaining
judicial discretion to move away from these valuations under undefined
circumstances, thus preserving the unpredictable use of “jurisprudence”
under conditions of uncertainty. We argue below that well-defined market
prices—not deal prices—are the only material evidence; everything else,
however otherwise relevant, becomes immaterial speculation divorced
from the reality of markets.
We have described the outlines of modern scientific evidence about
the accuracy of markets in pricing securities. Summarized, we can say
that a large number of analysts continually review new information about
companies, seeking a profitable (if momentary) trading advantage for
sophisticated institutional investors and traders, and that as a result, all
stocks are fairly priced with respect to each other considering expected
risk and returns. This effect is magnified by high-speed trading, which
taps into small differences in quoted prices, thus closing many of these
gaps. Thus, if one exits one stock, other stocks are readily available with
similar, if not identical, risk-return profiles, at minuscule transaction costs.
We can now state with confidence that in efficient capital markets, an
exiting shareholder who receives the pre-announcement market price, or
Vice Chancellor Laster captured this problem in Dell in describing directors’ search
duties in sales: “In this formulation, the key verb is ‘sought.’ Time-bound mortals cannot foresee
the future.” In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538 at *79 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016).
123
Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS.
LAW. at 941 (1985).
122
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more, for her shares has received fair value in compliance with the statute.
Judicial confusion over the years in distinguishing “fair market value”
from “fair value” should be set aside as a misleading side road. In short,
a heavy burden of proof should face any litigant claiming that an abstract
valuation model is a better measure of firm value than its market price. As
one student author stated: “Maybe Publius Was Right.”124
There are some dissenters from this view. Lawrence Hamermesh
and Michael Wachter argue that in a going private merger, if the controller
wants to minimize the price paid to the minority, the controller may
depress the market price through wrongdoing, such as deliberate poor
management.125 There may be cases where a controller has not shared a
potential business opportunity with the corporation that the controller
intends to hold until after a cashout merger, in which a challenge to the
fairness of the pre-bid market price would be appropriate, under the
Weinberger “entire fairness” doctrine. In Aruba, petitioners challenged
the validity of the market price because management deferred announcing
improved results until the end of the quarter when it included the
announcement of the merger agreement in its filing, thus blurring the
separate effects of the earnings and the merger.126 But the court rejected
any inference of manipulation because shareholders had all the
information in making their decision.127
Burton Malkiel, the distinguished financial economist, has
addressed the issue of investor myopia and potential mispricing of
securities relied upon in DFC and Dell by the Court of Chancery and
rejected by the Supreme Court:
These attacks on the efficient market theory are far from
convincing. Some of the market patterns discovered may
124
Daniel E. Myer, Maybe Publius Was Right: Relying on Merger Price to Determine
Fair Value in Delaware Appraisal Cases, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 153 (2016) (“Every thing [sic] is
worth what its purchaser will pay for it.” citing PUBLIUS SYRUS, THE MORAL SAYINGS OF
PUBLIUS SYRUS, A ROMAN SLAVE 71 (D. Lyman, Jr., trans., Cleveland, L. E. Barnard & Co.,
1856) While we agree with this sentiment, it is qualified by the exception in Section 262(h) for
stocks not widely traded, and by the statutory exception for anticipated results of the merger.
125
Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in
Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119, 132 (2005).
126
See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448–VCL,
2018 WL 922139 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018); see also Veritian Partners Master Fund Ltd. V.
Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018 WL 2315943 (Del. Ch, May 21, 2018).
127
Aruba, No. 11448–VCL, 2018 WL 922139 at *33–34. See also Aruba II, ., No.
11448-VCL, 2018 WL 2315943.
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have rational causes; others may be spurious. But none
of them are dependable in all time periods. And there is
no evidence that rational investors can exploit any of the
alleged mispricing in securities markets to earn aboveaverage returns. * * * In summary, I remain skeptical
that markets are systematically irrational, and that
knowledge of such irrationalities can lead to profitable
trading strategies. Indeed, the more potentially profitable
a trading strategy is, the less likely it is to survive.128
The appropriate response to corporate wrongdoing is through a
derivative action, not attempting to reconstruct what a company might
have been worth under honest management—a form of the Nirvana
fallacy. Valuation in an appraisal proceeding could conceivably include
the value of a derivative action to the company. Once a merger is
consummated, former shareholders lack standing to bring derivative
actions, but at least one court has held that the value of the derivative claim
may be included in an appraisal valuation.129 If one buys stock in a badly
managed company, the price the buyer pays is a discount from what it
would be with better or more honest controllers. In short, buying in at a
bargain price and selling out at a bargain price seems fair to the investor.
And there is evidence that controllers often obtain control to reduce agency
costs where managers have broad discretion.130
A.

Deal Prices Typically Exceed Previous Market Values and Thus
are Barred by Section 262(h)

The idea that combinations of businesses produce gains from trade
is hardly a new one. Nor is the idea that these gains arise from synergies
of various kinds. Because the law has long treated appraisal as allowing
an exit for an investor not willing to enter the newly created combination,
it was logical to limit the investor’s compensation to what his shares were
worth without considering the merger’s financial benefits or detriments.
Section 262(h) recognizes this, as most statutes do, in commanding the
court to determine the fair value of the dissenter’s shares, “exclusive of
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of
128
Burton G. Malkiel, Are Markets Efficient? – Yes, Even if They Make Errors, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 28, 2007, reprinted in William J. Carney, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE (3d ed), 149–51.
129
Grace Bros. v. Farley Industries, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. 1994).
130
Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes
and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985).
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the merger or consolidation . . . .”131 Henry Manne’s seminal paper,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, recognized that
companies are valued as going concerns with their current management,
and if that management was weak, and could be replaced by a stronger
management team, that change of control would generate greater profits
and add value to the firm.132 But the possibility of greater profit from
future changes is not part of “value” that can be included in appraised
value, according to the statute.
Replacing poor management is not the only source of value in
mergers and acquisitions. Consolidations often reduce costs in industries
with excess capacity.133 Technological change can make scale economies
more important and efficient for larger companies. Economies of scope
in marketing often provide suppliers with better leverage to obtain
improved shelf space.134 Creating a dominant producer also enhances
market power to set prices. Less frequently, tax benefits may play a role
in an acquisition. One of the most notable cases involving a tax-motivated
transaction was Smith v. Van Gorkom.135 Trans Union held large tax loss
carry-forwards that it could not expect to utilize in the foreseeable future,
but would be attractive to a tax-paying entity.136 A variety of target
characteristics can create value for bidders, such as economies of scale or
latent debt capacity, which upon acquisition would result in a net increase
in value for the business combination.137 Financial deals that take a
company private can also benefit from reducing the regulatory costs of
being a publicly traded company. These costs can be significant even for
large corporations.138
Holding a security for a long time may be evidence that the holder
is satisfied with the security’s performance and its role in the investor’s
131

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h).
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 112–13 (1965).
133
John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LAW &
ECON. 137 (1958).
134
See generally William J. Carney, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 11–21 (4th ed. 2016).
135
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
136
Bernard Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN L. REV. 597, 599–600
(1989) (discussing the use of purchase accounting to write up the value of assets, thus increasing
depreciation expense, a deductible item).
137
Ralph A. Walkling & Robert O. Edmeister, Determinants of Tender Offer Premiums,
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27, 30 (Jan.–Feb. 1985).
138
Cox Communications, with sales of $5.789 billion, went private for these reasons.
See generally, William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of
“Going Private,” 55 EMORY L. J. 141, 149 (2006).
132
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portfolio, and does not see a more attractive substitute (though
underperformance may well simply be reflected in the current price). One
could characterize the security’s price as “fair,” although this word is
rarely employed. This accounts for part of the popularity of index funds,
with their low cost buy and hold strategies, in today’s market. To persuade
an investor to relinquish a holding requires the offer of a more attractive
alternative. In stock markets, that alternative is typically a price at a
premium over today’s market price.
There is much evidence to support the assertion that selling
139
shareholders receive substantial premiums in acquisitions.
“It is
well accepted that creating value gains (synergy) or incremental cash
flows from mergers has been the dominating explanation provided to the
shareholders of moving parties.”140 One author calculated the premium
paid based on the market value of the target two months prior to the
announcement date minus one.141 Premiums averaged 19% in the 1960s,
35% in the 1970s, and 30% from 1980 to 1985.142 A study covering
mergers from 1999 to 2002showed average premiums of 36% in cash
mergers and 30% in stock for stock mergers.143 A study of deals from
2000 to 2008 shows average premiums for strategic bidders of 16.7%, and
11.7% for financial bidders.144 Returns to shareholders of bidders appear
much smaller, and in some cases are negative.145 Gains to bidder
shareholders appear to be smaller because of bidder competition for a
target.146 While there are some observers who attribute lower gains for
bidder shareholders (and sometimes losses) to agency costs—that poor
139
Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, (1983); Black, supra note 140; Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some Consequences in the Law of
Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 881 (2003). One study reports that total premiums
between 1981 and 1986 were $118.4 billion. Gregg A. Jarrell, et al., The Market for Corporate
Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2, No. 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988) (hereinafter
“Jarrell”).
140
Ahmad Ismail, Does Management’s Forecast of Merger Synergies Explain the
Premium Paid, the Method of Payment, and Merger Motives?, 40 FINANCIAL MGT. 879 (Winter
2011).
141
Id. at 884.
142
Jarrell, et al., supra note 143, at 51.
143
Hamermesh, supra note 143, at 913 (Appendix A) (2003).
144
Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, Strategic & Financial Bidders in
Takeover Auctions, 69 J. FIN. 2513, 2514 (2014).
145
Jarrell et al, supra note 143, at 53 (Table 1); Ralph A. Walkling and Robert O.
Edmister, Determinants of Tender Offer Premiums, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., 31-32 (Jan.–Feb.
1985).
146
Id.
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managers overspend in acquisitions—there is evidence to the contrary.147
One paper is more sympathetic, suggesting that with imperfect knowledge
of the future, many bidders may err in estimating future synergies and cost
reductions. Thus, the winner of an auction may, by making the most
optimistic estimate, suffer from the “winner’s curse.”148 A recent study,
using call option prices to measure gains in takeovers finds roughly equal
sharing between target and acquiring company shareholders.149 Ismail
uses different methodology, comparing actual accounting results over time
with estimated synergies, and finds lower returns to buyers.150 He finds
that buyers underpaid for predicted synergies in about one-third of cases
and overpaid in the other two-thirds.151 That, of course, does not change
the measure of gains from the transaction to target shareholders. However,
these studies are viewed, there are clear gains for target shareholders,
solely attributable to the acquisition.
B.

Control Premiums Only Exist at the Time of a Sale and are not
Part of the “Intrinsic Value” of a Firm

Some have argued that control premiums exist in every company,
and that takeover bidders merely exploit this invisible asset in acquisitions,
at the expense of small shareholders.152 The literature persuasively shows
that control premia do not exist without news of buyer interest.153 It shows,
in the case of financially motivated transactions involving “going private,”
147
Black, supra note 140 at 599 (1989) (disputing the market evidence in part based on
contrary studies of accounting statements); Nikhil P. Varaiya &Kenneth R. Ferris, Overpaying
in Corporate Takeovers: The Winner’s Curse, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., May–June, 1987, at 64.
But see Sarah B. Moeller, et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of AcquiringFirm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 40 J. Fin. 757 (2005) (finding that while most buyers
gained value, some very large buyers suffered massive losses in acquisitions, which they
attribute to information asymmetries).
148
Varaiya & Ferris, supra note 151, at 65.
149
Kathryn Barraclough, David T. Robinson, Tom Smith, & Robert E. Whaley, Using
Option Prices to Infer Overpayments and Synergies in M&A Transactions, 26, No. 3 REV. OF
FINANCIAL STUDIES 695, 719 (2013).
150
Ismail, supra note 144, at 905.
151
Id. at 889 (Table III).
152
For a refutation of this position, see Carney and Heimendinger, supra note 1, at 879–
80.
153
Id. at *29; Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling
Life of the 'Implicit Minority Discount' in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2007).[hereinafter Hamermesh & Wachter, Minority Discount] (taking a slightly different
approach, observing that control can carry a premium, but that it does not belong to the firm).
By negative implication, there is no minority discount that needs to be added in valuation of the
firm. They add one more benefit of control: the right to squeeze out the minority shareholders.
Id. at 53.

2018

THE DEATH OF APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE:
ENDING WINDFALLS FOR DEAL DISSENTERS

97

that these premiums “are due to the blocking power typically accorded
minority stockholders in going private transactions.”154 This is not to say
that a controlling shareholder can never receive benefits that are not shared
with minority shareholders, but rather that such benefits do not necessarily
involve agency costs, wealth transfers through self-dealing, or other forms
of wrongdoing. Instead, they may involve divergent preferences about
firm policies, such as timing and amount of firm distributions and
investments, riskiness of new projects, and riskiness of firm capital
structure, each with potential differential benefits for each group.155 We
argue that no control premium exists absent an acquisition. If a control
block is transferred from one shareholder to another, any premium paid
clearly belongs to the seller, absent any wrongdoing that harms the
entity.156
The fact that Gorbenko and Malenko’s study showed lower gains
from financial acquisitions is not dispositive on the issue of control
premiums.157 There is an abundant literature documenting the gains from
financial deals. To have premiums, there must necessarily be gains from
trade. Obviously, financial transactions do not involve synergies
involving reduced transaction costs between suppliers and customers, nor
gains from greater market dominance and pricing power, nor gains from
economies of scope or scale. Typically, in financial transactions there is
no replacement of one management team with a superior one, at least at
the onset.158 Gains instead come from the discipline imposed by higher
154

Jensen & Ruback, supra note 143, at 45.
William J. Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs,
ControlPremiums and Capital Structure, 65 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 1 (1987). Here we disagree with
John C. Coates, "Fair Value" As An Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in
Conflict Transactions, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1280 (1999). Coates assigns control premiums
to three basic categories: (1) synergy value – the value derived from a particular combination of
economic assets; (2) expropriation value – the value from being able to use control unfairly to
usurp value rightly belonging to the minority (which we believe is trivial if not nonexistent in
virtually all public companies); and (3) pure control value – the residual value attaching to the
authority to control corporate policy on an ethical and fiduciarily-compliant basis. Coates argues
that all control premiums "should be analyzed initially as reflecting each of these types of value."
Id. at 1274–77. No suggestion is given about how to unpack these three elements of a premium.
156
See, e.g., Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp., 901 A.2d 751, 762 (Del. Ch. 2006).
157
Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 148, at 2541–42.
158
We are unaware of studies that separate management treatment in financial
transactions as opposed to strategic deals. Most of the studies were done in the early stages of
hostile takeovers, with fewer done in the current era of negotiated transactions. One study found
that approximately 52% of all top managers will no longer be employed by a target three years
after a successful takeover. Perham, Surge in Executive Job Contracts, 32 DUN'S BUS. MONTH
86 (1981). In another study, Gregg Jarrell, in The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do
Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J. LAW & ECON. 151, 172 (1985), found 50% attrition rates
155
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leverage, greater management equity investments, the deductibility of
interest payments, use of underutilized tax benefits (Trans Union),
reduction of regulatory (securities compliance) costs, and more direct
owner supervision of management, all of which can reduce agency costs
and increase returns to equity.159 Michael Jensen has described financial
acquisitions as creating a new form of ownership:
organizations that are corporate in form but have no
public shareholders and are not listed or traded on
organized exchanges. . . . Their primary owners are not
individuals nor passively managed institutions but large
actively managed private equity institutions and
entrepreneurs that designate agents to manage and
monitor on their behalf and bind those agents with large
equity interests and contracts governing the use and
distribution of cash.160
Delaware’s treatment of the exclusion of effects of the merger
announcement has not been consistent. The Court of Chancery has
correctly stated that ”[i]n an arm's-length, synergistic transaction, the deal
price generally will exceed fair value because target fiduciaries bargain for

in one-half of the firms that successfully defeated bids. This figure, Jarrell believes, is well above
the normal turnover rate of 25%, suggesting that bids are traumatic events for managers
regardless of their success. See also Turnover at the Top, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 19, 1983, at 104;
Coff, Merger Mania Adds to Executive Woes, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 1982),
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/10/17/jobs/merger-mania-adds-to-executive-woes.html.
Charles Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers, 76 AM.
ECON. REV. 155 (1986). Knoeber characterized target managers as accepting deferred
compensation in many instances, which shareholders can opportunistically capture by accepting
a tender offer for control. See also Lambert & Larker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision–
Making and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCTG. & ECON. 179 (1985). Displacement after a change
of control appears to be one of the major risks facing managers. A BUSINESS WEEK survey of
1300 terminated managers was reported to have shown that nearly one-third were terminated
after a change of control. Walkling & Long, Strategic Issues in Cash Tender Offers: Predicting
Bid Premiums, Probability of Success, and Target Management's response, 4, No. 2 MIDLAND
CORP. FIN. J. 57, 64, n.10 (1986).
159
Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice, Going Private: Minority
Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J. L. & ECON. 367, 370–74 (1984); Jensen & Ruback,
supra note 144, at 23–24 (describing financial motivations); Matthew D. Cain & Steven M.
Davidoff, Form Over Substance? The Value of Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs,
36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 865–69 (2011) (noting the benefits of MBOs and citing studies)
William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Dark,”
55 EMORY L. J. 1, 2–3 (2005) (noting the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley costs on smaller public
companies); Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 148, at 2536–37.
160
Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV. 61 (1989).
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a premium that includes . . . a share of the anticipated synergies."161
Indeed, ‘the ability of target fiduciaries to obtain a premium to market
implies that they successfully extracted a portion of the value that the
acquirer planned to create and that the merger consideration therefore
exceeds the fair value of the standalone entity as a going concern.’"162 In
many cases the Delaware courts never discuss pre-deal announcement
market prices at all, virtually precluding exclusion of “any element of
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation.”163 This is so even though the Delaware Supreme Court has
recently noted that removal of the Delaware Block Method “does not mean
that the pre-transaction trading price of a public company’s shares is not
relevant to its fair value in appraisal,” while not mentioning that specific
value in the case at hand.164 As Fischel has observed, why should a
minority shareholder expect to receive more in a merger than he or she
could obtain by selling in an efficient market?165
C.

Backing Out of Control Premiums and Synergies to Obtain Firm
Values Involves Guesswork and Speculation

The Delaware courts have rarely taken the exclusion of control
premiums seriously. In Kleinwort Benson v. Silgan Corp., Chancellor
Chandler correctly declined to apply a control premium “because it
reflects value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger.”166 As he later explained, the court “will not specifically consider
. . . control premiums paid in merger transactions because those reflect
expected future profits after the merger (i.e., synergy values).”167 In
another case while the Court of Chancery conceded that “there remains
some uncertainty about the actual amount of impermissible post-merger
[synergies] reflected in [data on] control premiums”, it applied a 30%
control premium to eliminate an erroneously presumed minority
161
Olson v. EV3, Inc., No.5583-VCL 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 342011); see also Dell, 177
A.3d at 76–77.
162
Dunmire v. Farmers & Merch. Of W. Pa., Inc., No. 10589-CB, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS
167, at *24 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016).
163
See, e.g., Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., No. 6247-VCP, 2013 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 172, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013); infra Appendix A.
164
DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 373.
165
Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market
Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 917, 920 (1989).
166
Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. 11107, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *4
(Del. Ch. June 15, 1995).
167
ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 913 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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discount.168 The court should have recognized that any premium paid is
based on an expectation of benefits to the buyer from the transaction. In a
financially motivated “going private” transaction, the court found no
control premium, and that the only deal synergies were tax savings and
cost savings from going private, and accepted the deal price as the best
evidence of fair value (including whatever synergies from tax and agency
cost savings, and regulatory savings might have existed because of the
deal).169
The Delaware courts have long mistakenly concluded that where a
dominant shareholder exists, publicly traded shares must necessarily trade
at a discount.170 More recently, in Dell, the Court of Chancery erroneously
rejected market values as infected with investor myopia and an anchoring
bias, ignoring the dominance of sophisticated financial institutions and
analysts in today’s markets.171 On appeal this was reversed for an absence
of supporting evidence in an efficient market. Given current judicial
assumptions that control premiums are inherent in all companies, with or
without a dominant stockholder, the courts are faced with the impossible
task of separating included control premiums from excluded synergy
values in appraising value. One is tempted to ask, “will the Delaware
courts ever trust markets as investors do?”
The Court of Chancery has recognized the synergies included in any
deal premium.172 In Longpath Capital LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp. the
Court of Chancery attributed half of the deal premium to a “control
premium” (a discredited concept, as we discussed above) and the other
half to deal synergies.173 The court accepted the methodology of the
respondent’s expert, who attempted to determine the value of deal
synergies by examining premiums paid in strategic deals versus those
Borruso v. Commc’ns Telesystems Int’l, 753 A.2d 451, 459, n. 12 (Del. Ch. 1999).
Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., No. 6247-VCP, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172,
at *2, *8–9, *12 ( Del. Ch. July 8, 2013)
170
See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989); Rapid-American
Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).
171
Dell, 177 A.3d , at *102.
172
Kenneth R. Ahern, Bargaining Power and Industry Dependence in Mergers, 103 J.
FIN. ECONS. 530, 547 (2012) (showing that targets capture on average "modestly more" of the
merger gains than buyers); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and
Puzzling Life of the 'Implicit Minority Discount' in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 29 (2007) ("In an arm's-length transaction, an acquirer will pay a premium to [the equity
value] in purchasing the firm.”).
173
LongPath Capital, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., No. 8094-VCP, 2015 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 177, at *88–89 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015).
168
169
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(smaller) premiums paid in financial deals. The percentage difference, he
concluded, represented the synergies in strategic deals, with the balance of
synergy gains retained by the buyer. This may be a reasonable measure of
synergies, but Section 262(h) does not address synergies alone, but “any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger.” The Longpath court relied on a study by Gregg Jarrell, a frequent
witness in appraisal cases, that purported to find a “control premium” by
comparing deal premiums in acquisitions by strategic buyers with
acquisitions by financial buyers.174 This only demonstrates that
synergistic gains from trade vary across types of transactions, and
assuredly between transactions of the same type. More importantly,
averages conceal wide variances in outcomes in individual cases.
Perhaps the most egregious example of ignoring the exclusion rule
is Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., where Vice
Chancellor Laster recited much credible evidence about the size of the
synergies included in the deal price (about 20%) by the petitioner, only to
ultimately ignore this evidence, employing the deal price ($37.14), on the
basis that the company’s expert provided no opinion on this and the
company was late making this argument.175 The court observed that
evidence in the record indicated that the merger consideration “included a
portion of the value that Fidelity and THL expected to generate from
synergies.”176 It further noted that petitioner modeled $100 million in
synergies, or $7.50 per share.177 While relying on partisan experts, the
court ignored the more impartial evidence of pre-announcement value
from independent analysts, who had a median price target of $25.00 with
a high price target of $31.00.178 At the same time it cited another opinion
that “the price actually derived from the sale of a company as a whole . . .
may be considered as long as synergies are excluded.”179 The court also
ignored Vice Chancellor Glascock’s statement in In re Appraisal of
Ancestry.com, Inc., that the unique construction of Section 262 places
burdens on both parties, thus leaving judges on their own in determining

174

Id. at *79–82, *85.
Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., No. 9320-VCL, 2016 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 189, at *35, *38–39 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016).
176
Id. at *32.
177
Id. at *34.
178
Id. at *17.
179
Id. at *41, n. 5 (citing Prescott Gp. Small Cap. L.P. v. Coleman Co., No. 17802-VCL,
2004 WL 2059515 at *27 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004) (emphasis added)..
175
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fair value.180 The irony of that statement is that it was made in the face of
reliable market prices determined by expert traders and analysts with far
more expertise than a law-trained judge, and their own or clients’ money
at stake.181
In re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc. is a rare case where synergies in
the form of scale economies to achieve cost savings were discussed
extensively. The respondent’s expert specifically excluded them in his
calculation of fair value, resulting in a valuation well below the deal
price.182
The most recent ironic example is found in the Supreme Court’s
DFC Global opinion, where Chief Justice Strine conceded the accuracy
and rationality of the pre-announcement market price, but apparently not
its materiality, stating that because the shares at issue “were widely traded
on a public market based upon a rich information base, the ‘fair value of
the stockholder’s shares of stock held by minority stockholders like the
petitioners, would, to an economist, likely be best reflected by the prices
at which their shares were trading as of the merger.”183 Rather than
180
In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21: “It
is worth noting, however, that this task is made particularly difficult for the bench judge, not
simply because his training may not provide a background well-suited to the process, but also
because of the way the statute is constructed. A judge in Chancery is the finder of fact, and is
frequently charged to make difficult factual determinations that may be outside his area of
expertise. The saving judicial crutch in such situations is the burden of proof. The party with the
burden must explain why its version of the facts is the more plausible in a way comprehensible
and convincing to the trier of fact; if not, it has failed to carry its burden, and the judge's duty is
accordingly clear. A judge in a bench trial relies, therefore, on the burden of proof; he holds on
to it like a shipwreck victim grasps a floating deck-chair or an ex-smoker hoards his last piece
of nicotine gum. Section 262 is unusual in that it purports explicitly to allocate the burden of
proof to the petitioner and the respondent, an allocation not meaningful in light of the fact that
no default exists if the burden is not met; in reality, the ‘burden’ falls on the judge to determine
fair value, using ‘all relevant factors.’ Here, therefore, I must independently review those factors
to determine ‘fair value,’ the price per share to which the Petitioners are entitled.” See also In
re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc., 2017 WL 2334852 (Del. Ch. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Merlin v.
Sws Group, 2018 Del. LEXIS 77.
181
Vice Chancellor Laster reviewed the difficulties the Court of Chancery has faced in
this area in his Aruba opinion, No. 11448–VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *44–45. See also In re
Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21 at *2, where Vice
Chancellor Glascock noted “ I have commented elsewhere on the difficulties, if not outright
incongruities, of a law-trained judge determining fair value of a company in light of an auction
sale, aided by experts offering wildly different opinions on value.” Later he referred to the
difficulties of employing a DCF analysis with a mind “softened as it has been by a liberal arts
education.” Id. at *59.
182
In re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc., 2017 WL 2334852 at *8.
183
DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.2d 346, 367 (Del. 2017).
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concede that valuation is a question determined by markets, he rejected
that, arguing that the court had earlier “adopted a definition of fair value
that is a jurisprudential, rather than purely economic, construct.” Here the
court cites a minority discount case for the assertion that “going concern”
value includes the pro rata value of the entire enterprise.184 There is no
mention of the exclusion of the anticipated or realized effects of the
merger.
Following Chief Justice Strine’s lead, Justice Valihura’s Dell
opinion preserves the notion that Delaware law makes valuation a
jurisprudential concept and omits any discussion of market value or the
limitations of Section 262(h).185
Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion in Aruba reflects unusual candor
by the parties and their experts: “The parties agree that it is not possible to
determine with precision what portion of the final deal price reflects
synergy value. The respondent’s expert conceded that ‘[t]he percentage
of synergies actually paid by HP to Aruba cannot be accurately
measured.’”186
Vice Chancellor Laster’s response to concerns about value boil
down to whether the investors were given at least as much as or more than
the market price determined in an efficient market without manipulation:
Perhaps different negotiators could have extracted a
greater share of the synergies from HP in the form of a
higher deal price. * * * An outcome along these lines
would have resulted in HP sharing a greater portion of the
anticipated synergies with Aruba’s stockholders. It would
not have changed Aruba’s standalone value. Hence, it
would not have affected Aruba’s fair value for purposes
of an appraisal.187

184

Id. (citing Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d , at 1144–45. As we have pointed out, the notion
of a “control premium” employed in Cavalier Oil, is a discredited one. And yet it persists here
in an amorphous fashion.
185
There is a rote recital of the statutory limit on value without any discussion of its
application in the case at hand. See Dell, 177 A.3d, at *38.
186
Aruba, No. 11448–VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *44.
187
Id.
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EXPLORING SOLUTIONS

The uncertainty created by the proliferation of appraisal litigation,
driven by appraisal arbitrageurs that take little risk at the present, creates
real costs for deals, and ultimately for the economy. Buyers are
increasingly insisting on “outs” from deals, thus limiting the advantages
made available in acquisitions.188 The more competitive the market for
the target, the greater its bargaining power, and the higher the acquisition
price will rise, leaving fewer benefits from the bargain for the buyer, and
the more buyers will insist on outs if holders of many shares seek
appraisal. Other buyers may back out of deals if they can’t obtain such an
out, and those costs will remain invisible.
There are two goals in reform. First, in the interest of economic
efficiency, where a selling process is a model of thoroughness and
independence, why should a court ever second-guess the deal price as the
ceiling on fair value? Why should we expect non-expert judges,
potentially influenced by polarized and biased experts, to know more
about the value of a stock than the company’s own directors and
shareholders, all of whom have skin in the game, in terms of stock and
stock options? Second, why should a privileged few (large) shareholders
receive more compensation than the majority of informed disinterested
shareholders who approved the transaction?
With this in mind, we offer the following consequences from simply
following the statute, respecting market valuations rather than those of
biased experts, and excluding prices influenced by expectations or
realizations of the effects of a merger.189

188
Appraisal Risk in Private Equity Transactions, PRIV. EQUITY DIG. (Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind,
Wharton
&
Garrison
LLP),
May
2017,
at
4,
https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3977122/may-2017-pe-digest-r15.pdf. (showing an increase
in the percentage of agreements with appraisal outs in public deals from 4.1% in 2014 to 18.1%
in the first two months of 2017); Audra Boone et al., Merger Negotiations in the shadow of
Judicial Appraisal, Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 381 (June 11, 2018), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039040, (arguing that there is no
evidence that appraisal risks lower bidders’ offers to compensate for the risk). In part that may
be true because appraisal outs remove that risk for bidders, but raise the risk of failure for targets.
189
Ironically, we quote Justice Walsh’s opinion in Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc.,
567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) (quoting the Chancellor) (“A decent respect for reality forces
one to admit that . . . advice [of an investment banker] is frequently a pale substitute for the
dependable information that a canvas of the relevant market can provide.”).
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For public companies, there are four categories:
1. Cash mergers where there is no controlling shareholder.
2. Cash mergers involving a controlling shareholder.
3. Stock mergers where there is no controlling shareholder.190
4. Stock mergers where there is a controlling shareholder.
Here are the issues in each category:
1.

Cash mergers where there is no controlling shareholder.

Here we have simple disinterested majority approval by both
shareholders and directors, assuming a proper search and full disclosure.
Most of the recent appraisal cases fit this description. If the goal of
appraisal is exit from an unwanted merger, a cash deal satisfies that need.
If the goal of appraisal is fair value, any deal price at or above the preannouncement price more than satisfies that need.
2.

Cash mergers involving a controlling shareholder.

As in #1, exit is satisfied here. If the goal of appraisal is fair value,
any price above the pre-announcement price more than satisfies that need,
because shareholders bought into a company with a controlling
shareholder, and thus accepted the possibility of a cash-out.191
3.

Stock mergers where there is no controlling shareholder.

Here, if there is a board search that satisfies business judgment rule
standards, and approval by a majority of fully independent shareholders,
a decent respect for board and shareholder collective judgment requires
deferral to that price, and employment of the pre-announcement value of
the stock as fair value.192 In this case, as in the final one, some attention
might be paid to the statute, where Section 144 provides a safe harbor from
challenges to director actions.
4.

Stock mergers with a controlling shareholder.

190
We include stock mergers for purposes of a complete model, recognizing that there
are exceptions from the appraisal right in stock mergers where shareholder are to receive shares
in a publicly traded corporation, under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2)b.
191
Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of the
'Implicit Minority Discount' in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 53 (2007).
192
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
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Where a merger with a controlling shareholder is approved by an
independent board or committee with full power to consider alternatives
and to recommend them, and the transaction is conditioned on approval by
fully informed independent shareholders, there is no reason for a court to
be concerned about the fairness of the price, beyond the conceit that judges
know best.193
For all these categories, courts could implement the reforms we
suggest under existing statutory law. That said, legislative codification of
this approach is certainly welcome, because codification would make it
more difficult for courts to resist this approach and substitute their own
discretionary valuations for the pre-deal market prices.
Our discussion until now has concerned publicly traded firms, for
which using the pre-deal market price to calculate the appraisal remedy
appropriately satisfies the requirement of Section 262(h) to exclude the
value of deal synergies. But this approach is not available for transactions
involving closely held target firms, because for them there is no pre-deal
market price. This does not mean, however, that value in such cases must
necessarily be established via judicial discretion. Discretionary valuation
is also problematic for closely held firms,194 and alternatives to judicial
discretion are available for them too.
One way that closely held transacting parties may protect
themselves from discretionary judicial valuation is by including a
discretion limiting, algorithmic valuation clause in their charters, bylaws,
joint venture agreements, or buyout provisions.195 With such a
193

Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
See e.g., Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290 (Del. Ch.
2006) (Strine, V.C.) (exercising judicial discretion to asymmetrically split the difference
between the party experts to value a medical practice entity at a figure maintained by neither of
the parties to the appraisal litigation). For other examples of unpredictable judicial difference
splitting in Delaware appraisal cases involving both public and private firms, see Keith
Sharfman, Contractual Valuation Mechanisms and Corporate Law, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 53,
61 n. 32–33 (2007) (collecting cases). These unpredictable, divergent results cause appraisal
litigants to invest excessively in their evidentiary presentations and raise the cost of settlement.
Id. at 59; see also Keith Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving
Valuation Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV. 357, 360, 377 (2003).
195
Litigation management bylaws have in recent years become quite common for
Delaware firms, especially now that the Delaware courts enforce them (see In re Revlon, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch., 2010)) and the Delaware legislature in
2015 specifically authorized them in Section 115, at least as to so-called “intra-corporate
disputes,” which appraisal actions surely are. But we must note that at least as to forum selection
194
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"contractual valuation mechanism" in place, value is calculated
algorithmically on the basis of a pre-specified formula involving partysupplied and/or neutral expert appraisals, effectively eliminating judicial
discretion to find value in some other way.196 A typical contractual
valuation structure is for the parties to offer competing appraisals with the
average of them becoming the conclusive value if it is no more than 10%
higher than the lower of the two appraisals. Otherwise, a third appraiser
is chosen by a pre-specified neutral party (such as the target firm’s external
auditor), and the resulting neutral figure (or an average of that figure with
one or both or the party appraisals, if they are close enough—say, within
30%—to the neutral figure) becomes the conclusive value.197 This
structure provides predictable outcomes and gives valuation disputants the
incentive to offer conciliatory figures, thereby reducing the cost of
litigation and increasing the chance of settlement. And most importantly,
to protect the parties from discretionary valuation by the trier of fact.
There are many examples of firms using such clauses in intracorporate agreements.198 And the Court of Chancery has accepted such
pre-specified formulas and enforced them in appraisal litigation.199 If the
Supreme Court were to follow suit, closely held transacting parties would
likely welcome the development.
Algorithmic valuation also holds promise as an alternative to
discretionary judicial valuation (for appraisal cases, as well as for
valuation disputes in other legal contexts) even when the litigants have not
specified such a valuation mechanism in advance of any dispute. As one

and potentially in other respects, they are now under challenge in federal court. See generally
John C. Jorgenson, Drafting Effective Delaware Forum-Selection Clauses in the Shadow of
Enforcement Uncertainty, 102 IOWA L. REV. 353 (2017) (discussing the enforceability of
forum-selection bylaws); Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate
Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333 (2012).
196
See Keith Sharfman, Contractual Valuation Mechanisms and Corporate Law, 2 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 53 (2007) (introducing the concept of contractual valuations mechanisms,
documenting their frequent use by both public and private firms and their successful
enforcement in Delaware, and proposing that they be used in conjunction with choice of law and
forum selection clauses in corporate charters as a way for transacting parties to insulate
themselves from discretionary judicial valuation).
197
Id. at 66.
198
See Id. at 66–69, 78–88 (discussing and tabulating multiple examples).
199
Nextel Commc'ns, Inc. v. Nextel Partners, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 1704-N (Del. Ch. Nov.
18, 2005) (Transcript of Oral Ruling) (enforcing a valuation mechanism in appraisal litigation
concerning a buyout in the Sprint/Nextel joint venture).
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of us has argued elsewhere,200 algorithmic valuation may be legislatively
imposed, making available to valuation litigants the valuation mechanisms
that sophisticated transacting parties who anticipate valuation disputes
agree to use in lieu of open-ended discretionary valuation by the trier of
fact. Such market mimicking legislation is especially needed for corporate
appraisal of closely held firms for which there is not a pre-deal market
price on which the trier of fact may rely.201
A final issue to consider concerning algorithmic valuation is the
case of multiple parties. Suppose, for instance, that there are multiple
shareholders of a closely held firm dissenting from a transaction and
seeking a judicial appraisal of their shares as a remedy. And suppose
further that these dissenting shareholders divide into two or more groups,
contending for two or more proposed valuations. Is there an algorithmic
mechanism for resolving the dispute in such a circumstance?
The answer to that question is "yes." All that need be done in such
a case is to calculate an appropriately weighted average proposed
valuation for the dissenting shareholders.202 For instance, if 60% of the
dissenters contend that the appraisal value of their shares is $X and 40%
of the dissenters maintain that the appraisal value is $Y, the weighted
average of the dissenting shareholders’ position would be [(0.6 )(X) +
(0.4)(Y)]. It would then be a simple matter to apply the mandated twoparty algorithm to the resulting weighted average and the opposing side’s
competing figure. In this way, a weighted averaging of multiple valuations
on the same side could itself become part of the valuation algorithm and
thereby obviate the need for (or justification of) discretionary judicial
valuation in appraisal cases that continues to persist in Delaware.

200
Keith Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving Valuation
Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV. 357, 358 (2003) (“propos[ing] a new default valuation procedure,
modeled on the algorithmic valuation clauses commonly used in the contracts of sophisticated
firms, that would encourage parties to valuation disputes to introduce more plausible valuations
into evidence and limit adjudicative discretion over how to resolve any remaining differences.”);
On algorithmic implementation of law more generally, see Anthony Casey & Anthony Niblett,
The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L. J. 1401 (2017) (suggesting that legal rules and
standards may be satisfied via algorithmic microdirectives that do not require factfinding by an
adjudicator).
201
Keith Sharfman, Contractual Valuation Mechanisms and Corporate Law, 2 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. at 59 (explaining that “the legal valuation problem is perhaps most acute in the
corporate appraisal context, where the stakes are often high and the problem frequently recurs”).
202
On utilizing weighted averages in situations of multi-party/multi-positional valuation
litigation, see Keith Sharfman, Judicial Valuation Behavior: Some Evidence from Bankruptcy,
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 387, 398–399 (2005); see also Sharfman, 88 MINN. L. REV. at 376, 383.
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CONCLUSION
Each block of Marble, Michelangelo believed (or
purported to believe) contained a sculpture; the sculptor’s
job was merely to pitch the overburden to reveal the
beauty within. Early jurists believed (or purported to
believe) something similar about common law; that it
existed in perfect form, awaiting “finding” by the judge.
By contrast, even Blackstone would expect that statutory
law would be an explicit, if blunt, tool of justice;
manufactured, rather than revealed. Our appraisal statute,
Section 262 of the DGCL, is an exception. Broth of many
cooks and opaque of intent, it provides every opportunity
for judicial sculpting.203
Returning to some deference for statutory guidance would eliminate
much uncertainty and decrease legal costs. This statute is clear enough,
and principles of finance and materiality are equally so.
We have mainly argued here for reliance on the pre-deal market
price for share valuation in appraisal litigation involving public
companies. To achieve this result, the courts would simply need to give
actual respect to market prices rather than merely pay them lip service as
the Supreme Court has consistently done, most recently in Dell and DFC.
And abandoning the so-called "jurisprudence" of discretionary valuation
would have the added virtue of obeying and giving effect to the statutory
command in Section 262(h) to exclude the value of synergies from the
appraisal calculus.
For appraisal of shares in closely held firms, we have suggested that
parties protect themselves transactionally from discretionary valuation
with contractual valuation mechanisms in their charters, bylaws, joint
venture agreements, and other buyout provisions. We have also suggested
that legislation imposing an algorithmic valuation process for appraisal
cases involving closely held firms that is akin to what sophisticated firms
often themselves agree to is possible to do and would be a salutary reform
that would substantially improve upon the regime of discretionary
valuation that now prevails in appraisal cases.
203
In re Appraisal of AOL, Inc., No. 11204-VCG, 2018 Del. Ch. 2018 WL 1037450, *1
(Glascock, V.C.).
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